Lyotard, Jean-Francois - The Postmodern Condition - A report.pdf

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Jean-François Lyotard (1979)
The Postmodern
Condition
A Report on Knowledge
Source : The Postmodern Condition (1979) publ. Manchester University
Press, 1984. The First 5 Chapters of main body of work are reproduced
here.
1. The Field: Knowledge in
Computerised Societies
Our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies
enter what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known
as the postmodern age.' This transition has been under way since at least the
end of the 1950s, which for Europe marks the completion of reconstruction.
The pace is faster or slower depending on the country, and within countries it
varies according to the sector of activity: the general situation is one of
temporal disjunction which makes sketching an overview difficult. A portion
of the description would necessarily be conjectural. At any rate, we know that
it is unwise to put too much faith in futurology.
Rather than painting a picture that would inevitably remain incomplete, I
will take as my point of departure a single feature, one that immediately
defines our object of study. Scientific knowledge is a kind of discourse. And it
is fair to say that for the last forty years the "leading" sciences and
technologies have had to do with language: phonology and theories of
linguistics, problems of communication and cybernetics, modern theories of
algebra and informatics, computers and their languages, problems of
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translation and the search for areas of compatibility among computer
languages, problems of information storage and data banks, telematics and the
perfection of intelligent terminals, to paradoxology. The facts speak for
themselves (and this list is not exhaustive).
These technological transformations can be expected to have a considerable
impact on knowledge. Its two principal functions - research and the
transmission of acquired learning-are already feeling the effect, or will in the
future. With respect to the first function, genetics provides an example that is
accessible to the layman: it owes its theoretical paradigm to cybernetics. Many
other examples could be cited. As for the second function, it is common
knowledge that the miniaturisation and commercialisation of machines is
already changing the way in which learning is acquired, classified, made
available, and exploited. It is reasonable to suppose that the proliferation of
information-processing machines is having, and will continue to have, as much
of an effect on the circulation of learning as did advancements in human
circulation (transportation systems) and later, in the circulation of sounds and
visual images (the media).
The nature of knowledge cannot survive unchanged within this context of
general transformation. It can fit into the new channels, and become
operational, only if learning is translated into quantities of information." We
can predict that anything in the constituted body of knowledge that is not
translatable in this way will be abandoned and that the direction of new
research will be dictated by the possibility of its eventual results being
translatable into computer language. The "producers" and users of knowledge
must now, and will have to, possess the means of translating into these
languages whatever- they want to invent or learn. Research on translating
machines is already well advanced." Along with the hegemony of computers
comes a certain logic, and therefore a certain set of prescriptions determining
which statements are accepted as "knowledge" statements.
We may thus expect a thorough exteriorisation of knowledge with respect to
the "knower," at whatever point he or she may occupy in the knowledge
process. The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable
from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming
obsolete and will become ever more so. The relationships of the suppliers and
users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and
will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of
commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and
consume - that is, the form of value. Knowledge is and will be produced in
order to be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to be valorised in a new
production: in both cases, the goal is exchange.
Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself, it loses its "use-value."
It is widely accepted that knowledge has become the principle force of
production over the last few decades, this has already had a noticeable effect
on the composition of the work force of the most highly developed countries
and constitutes the major bottleneck for the developing countries. In the
postindustrial and postmodern age, science will maintain and no doubt
strengthen its preeminence in the arsenal of productive capacities of the
nation-states. Indeed, this situation is one of the reasons leading to the
conclusion that the gap between developed and developing countries will grow
ever wider in the future.
But this aspect of the problem should not be allowed to overshadow the
other, which is complementary to it. Knowledge in the form of an
informational commodity indispensable to productive power is already, and
will continue to be, a major - perhaps the major - stake in the worldwide
competition for power. It is conceivable that the nation-states will one day
fight for control of information, just as they battled in the past for control over
territory, and afterwards for control of access to and exploitation of raw
materials and cheap labor. A new field is opened for industrial and commercial
strategies on the one hand, and political and military strategies on the other.
However, the perspective I have outlined above is not as simple as I have
made it appear. For the merchantilisation of knowledge is bound to affect the
privilege the nation-states have enjoyed, and still enjoy, with respect to the
production and distribution of learning. The notion that learning falls within
the purview of the State, as the brain or mind of society, will become more and
more outdated with the increasing strength of the opposing principle,
according to which society exists and progresses only if the messages
circulating within it are rich in information and easy to decode. The ideology
of communicational "transparency," which goes hand in hand with the
commercialisation of knowledge, will begin to perceive the State as a factor of
opacity and "noise." It is from this point of view that the problem of the
relationship between economic and State powers threatens to arise with a new
urgency.
Already in the last few decades, economic powers have reached the point of
imperilling the stability of the state through new forms of the circulation of
capital that go by the generic name of multi-national corporations. These new
forms of circulation imply that investment decisions have, at least in part,
passed beyond the control of the nation-states." The question threatens to
become even more thorny with the development of computer technology and
telematics. Suppose, for example, that a firm such as IBM is authorised to
occupy a belt in the earth's orbital field and launch communications satellites
or satellites housing data banks. Who will have access to them? Who will
determine which channels or data are forbidden? The State? Or will the State
simply be one user among others? New legal issues will be raised, and with
them the question: "who will know?"
Transformation in the nature of knowledge, then, could well have
repercussions on the existing public powers, forcing them to reconsider their
relations (both de jure and de facto) with the large corporations and, more
generally, with civil society. The reopening of the world market, a return to
vigorous economic competition, the breakdown of the hegemony of American
capitalism, the decline of the socialist alternative, a probable opening of the
Chinese market these and many other factors are already, at the end of the
1970s, preparing States for a serious reappraisal of the role they have been
accustomed to playing since the 1930s: that of, guiding, or even directing
investments. In this light, the new technologies can only increase the urgency
of such a re-examination, since they make the information used 'in decision
making (and therefore the means of control) even more mobile and subject to
piracy.
It is not hard to visualise learning circulating along the same lines as money,
instead of for its "educational" value or political (administrative, diplomatic,
military) importance; the pertinent distinction would no longer be between
knowledge and ignorance, but rather, as is the case with money, between
"payment knowledge" and "investment knowledge" - in other words, between
units of knowledge exchanged in a daily maintenance framework (the
reconstitution of the work force, "survival") versus funds of knowledge
dedicated to optimising the performance of a project.
If this were the case, communicational transparency would be similar to
liberalism. Liberalism does not preclude an organisation of the flow of money
in which some channels are used in decision making while others are only
good for the payment of debts. One could similarly imagine flows of
knowledge travelling along identical channels of identical nature, some of
which would be reserved for the "decision makers," while the others would be
used to repay each person's perpetual debt with respect to the social bond.
2. The Problem: Legitimation
That is the working hypothesis defining the field within which I intend to
consider the question of the status of knowledge. This scenario, akin to the one
that goes by the name "the computerisation of society" (although ours is
advanced in an entirely different spirit), makes no claims of being original, or
even true. What is required of a working hypothesis is a fine capacity for
discrimination. The scenario of the computerisation of the most highly
developed societies allows us to spotlight (though with the risk of excessive
magnification) certain aspects of the transformation of knowledge and its
effects on public power and civil institutions - effects it would be difficult to
perceive from other points of view. Our hypotheses, therefore, should not be
accorded predictive value in relation to reality, but strategic value in relation to
the question raised.
Nevertheless, it has strong credibility, and in that sense our choice of this
hypothesis is not arbitrary. It has been described extensively by the experts
and is already guiding certain decisions by the governmental agencies and
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