The_Korean_War_Years_of_Stalemate.pdf
(
2053 KB
)
Pobierz
THE KOREAN WAR
Y
EARS OF
S
TALEMATE
July 1951–July 1953
Introduction
The Korean War was the first major armed clash between Free
World and Communist forces, as the so-called Cold War turned hot. The
half-century that now separates us from that conflict, however, has
dimmed our collective memory. Many Korean War veterans have consid-
ered themselves forgotten, their place in history sandwiched between the
sheer size of World War II and the fierce controversies of the Vietnam
War. The recently built Korean War Veterans Memorial on the National
Mall and the upcoming fiftieth anniversary commemorative events
should now provide well-deserved recognition. I hope that this series of
brochures on the campaigns of the Korean War will have a similar effect.
The Korean War still has much to teach us: about military prepared-
ness, about global strategy, about combined operations in a military
alliance facing blatant aggression, and about the courage and persever-
ance of the individual soldier. The modern world still lives with the con-
sequences of a divided Korea and with a militarily strong, economically
weak, and unpredictable North Korea. The Korean War was waged on
land, on sea, and in the air over and near the Korean peninsula. It lasted
three years, the first of which was a seesaw struggle for control of the
peninsula, followed by two years of positional warfare as a backdrop to
extended cease-fire negotiations. The following essay is one of five
accessible and readable studies designed to enhance understanding of
the U.S. Army’s role and achievements in the Korean conflict.
During the next several years the Army will be involved in many
fiftieth anniversary activities, from public ceremonies and staff rides to
professional development discussions and formal classroom training.
The commemoration will be supported by the publication of various
materials to help educate Americans about the war. These works will
provide great opportunities to learn about this important period in the
Army’s heritage of service to the nation.
This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military
History by Andrew J. Birtle. I hope this absorbing account, with its list
of further readings, will stimulate further study and reflection. A com-
plete listing of the Center of Military History’s available works on the
Korean War is included in the Center’s online catalog:
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/brochure.htm.
JOHN S. BROWN
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
Years of Stalemate
July 1951–July 1953
The first twelve months of the Korean War (June 1950–June 1951)
had been characterized by dramatic changes in the battlefront as the
opposing armies swept up and down the length of the Korean peninsula.
This war of movement virtually ended on 10 July 1951, when represen-
tatives from the warring parties met in a restaurant in Kaesong to negoti-
ate an end to the war. Although the two principal parties to the con-
flict—the governments of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea)—were
more than willing to fight to the death, their chief patrons—the People’s
Republic of China and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United
States and the United Nations (UN) on the other—were not. Twelve
months of bloody fighting had convinced Mao Tse-tung, Joseph V.
Stalin, and Harry S. Truman that it was no longer in their respective
national interests to try and win a total victory in Korea. The costs in
terms of men and materiel were too great, as were the risks that the con-
flict might escalate into a wider, global conflagration. Consequently,
they compelled their respective Korean allies to accept truce talks as the
price for their continued military, economic, and diplomatic support.
For the soldiers at the front and the people back home, the com-
mencement of negotiations raised hopes that the war would soon be over,
but such was not to be. While desirous of peace, neither side was willing
to sacrifice core principles or objectives to obtain it. The task of finding
common ground was further complicated by the Communists’ philoso-
phy of regarding negotiations as war by other means. This tactic signifi-
cantly impeded the negotiations. And while the negotiators engaged in
verbal combat around the conference table, the soldiers in the field con-
tinued to fight and die—for two more long and tortuous years.
Strategic Setting
The advent of truce talks in July 1951 came on the heels of a suc-
cessful United Nations offensive that had not only cleared most of South
Korea of Communist forces but captured limited areas of North Korea
as well. By 10 July the front lines ran obliquely across the Korean penin-
sula from the northeast to the southwest. In the east, UN lines anchored
on the Sea of Japan about midway between the North Korean towns of
Kosong and Kansong. From there the front fell south to the
“Punchbowl,” a large circular valley rimmed by jagged mountains,
Hyesanjin
R
MANCHURIA
Ch’osan
CHANGJIN
(CHOSIN)
RES
Hagaru-ri
Iwon
Unsan
Sinuiju
Hungnam
Chongju
SEA
Sinanju
OF
Wonsan
JAPAN
P’YONGYANG
Kosong
P’yonggang
Kansong
Kumhwa
Ch’orwon
Yangyang
38
°
Kaesong
38
Munsan-ni
Uijongbu
Ch’unch’on
Hongch’on
SEOUL
Samch’ok
Wonju
Inch'on
Suwon
YELLOW
Chech’on
Osan
Ulchin
Ch’ungju
SEA
Andong
Taejon
P’ohang-dong
Kunsan
Taegu
Miryang
Masan
KOREA
High
Ground
Above 200 Meters
PUSAN
Mokp’o
0
50 MILES
before heading west across the razor-backed Taebaek Mountains to the
“Iron Triangle,” a strategic communications hub around the towns of
P’yonggang, Kumhwa, and Ch’orwon. From there the front dropped
south once again through the Imjin River Valley until it reached the
Yellow Sea at a point roughly twenty miles north of Seoul. Manning this
line were over 554,000 UN soldiers—approximately 253,000 Americans
(including the 1st Marine, 1st Cavalry, and 2d, 3d, 7th, 24th, and 25th
Infantry Divisions), 273,000 South Koreans, and 28,000 men drawn
from eighteen countries—Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia,
Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey, and the Union of South Africa. Facing them were over 459,000
Communist troops, more than half of whom were soldiers of the
Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
.
Since the political leaders of the two warring coalitions had sig-
naled their willingness to halt the fighting, the generals on both sides
proved reluctant to engage in any major new undertakings. For the
most part the commander of UN forces, General Matthew B. Ridgway,
and his principal subordinate, General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth
Army commander, confined their activities to strengthening UN posi-
tions and conducting limited probes of enemy lines. Their Communist
counterparts adopted a similar policy. Consequently, the two sides
exchanged artillery fire, conducted raids and patrols, and occasionally
attempted to seize a mountain peak here or there, but for the most part
the battle lines remained relatively static.
So too, unfortunately, did the positions of the truce negotiators,
who were unable to make any progress on the peace front during the
summer. The chief stumbling block was the inability of the parties to
agree on a cease-fire line. The Communists argued for a return to the
status quo ante
—that is, that the two armies withdraw their forces to
the prewar boundary line along the 38th Parallel. This was not an
unreasonable position, since the combat lines were not all that far from
the 38th Parallel. The UN, however, refused to agree to a restoration of
the old border on the grounds that it was indefensible in many places.
Current UN positions were much more defensible, and a more defensi-
ble border was clearly advantageous, not only in protecting South
Korea in the present conflict, but in discouraging future Communist
aggression. Consequently, UN negotiators argued in favor of adopting
the current line of contact as the cease-fire line.
A deadlock immediately ensued, with the Communists employ-
ing every conceivable artifice to undermine the UN position. They
argued over every point, large and small, procedural as well as sub-
5
Plik z chomika:
janiu00
Inne pliki z tego folderu:
Kronika walk powietrznych w Korei.pdf
(44950 KB)
Kronika walk powietrznych w Korei.jpg
(199 KB)
Fire & Ice.pdf
(33575 KB)
Fire & Ice.jpg
(161 KB)
Armour of the Korean War 1950-53.jpg
(129 KB)
Inne foldery tego chomika:
Barbarosssa_lato 1941
Militaria
Zgłoś jeśli
naruszono regulamin