Plantinga; The ontological argument.pdf

Alvin Plantinga

The Ontological Argument

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The Ontological Argument

ALVIN PLANTINGA

[1] The third theistic argument I wish to discuss is the famous "ontological argument" first

formulated by Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century. This argument for the

existence of God has fascinated philosophers ever since Anselm first stated it. Few people, I

should think, have been brought to belief in God by means of this argument; nor has it

played much of a role in strengthening and confirming religious faith. At first sight Anselm's

argument is remarkably unconvincing if not downright irritating; it looks too much like a

parlor puzzle or word magic. And yet nearly every major philosopher from the time of

Anselm to the present has had something to say about it; this argument has a long and

illustrious line of defenders extending to the present. Indeed, the last few years have seen a

remarkable flurry of interest in it among philosophers. What accounts for its fascination?

Not, I think, its religious significance, although that can be underrated. Perhaps there are

two reasons for it. First, many of the most knotty and difficult problems in philosophy meet

in this argument. Is existence a property? Are existential propositions -- propositions of the

form x exists -- ever necessarily true? Are existential propositions about what they seem to

be about? Are there, in any respectable sense of "are," some objects that do not exist? If

so, do they have any properties? Can they be compared with things that do exist? These

issues and a hundred others arise in connection with Anselm's argument. And second,

although the argument certainly looks at first sight as if it ought to be unsound, it is

profoundly difficult to say what, exactly, is wrong with it. Indeed, I do not believe that any

philosopher has ever given a cogent and conclusive refutation of the ontological argument in

its various forms.

[2] At first sight, [Anselm's] argument smacks of trumpery and deceit; but suppose we look

at it a bit more closely. Its essentials are contained in these words:

And assuredly that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the

understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone; then it can be

conceived to exist in reality; which is greater.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the

understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is

one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence

there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be

conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

[3] How can we outline this argument? It is best construed, I think, as a reductio ad

absurdum argument. In a reductio you prove a given proposition p by showing that its

denial, not-p , leads to (or more strictly, entails) a contradiction or some other kind of

absurdity. Anselm's argument can be seen as an attempt to deduce an absurdity from the

proposition that there is no God. If we use the term "God" as an abbreviation for Anselm's

phrase "the being than which nothing greater can be conceived," then the argument seems

to go approximately as follows: Suppose

(1) God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (reductio assumption)

(2) Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone.

(premise)

Alvin Plantinga

The Ontological Argument

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(3) God's existence in reality is conceivable. (premise)

(4) If God did exist in reality, then He would be greater than He is. [from (1) and

(2)]

(5) It is conceivable that there is a being greater than God is. [(3) and (4)]

(6) It is conceivable that there be a being greater than the being than which nothing

greater can be conceived. [(5) by the definition of "God"]

[4] But surely (6) is absurd and self-contradictory; how could we conceive of a being

greater than the being than which none greater can be conceived? So we may conclude that

(7) It is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality.

[5] It follows that if God exists in the understanding, He also exists in reality; but clearly

enough He does exist in the understanding, as even the fool will testify; therefore, He exists

in reality as well.

[6] Now when Anselm says that a being exists in the understanding, we may take him, I

think, as saying that someone has thought of or thought about that being. When he says

that something exists in reality, on the other hand, he means to say simply that the thing in

question really does exist. And when he says that a certain state of affairs is conceivable, he

means to say, I believe, that this state of affairs is possible in our broadly logical sense,

there is a possible world in which it obtains. This means that step (3) above may be put

more perspicuously as

(3') It is possible that God exists

and step (6) as

(6') It is possible that there be a being greater than the being than which it is not

possible that there be a greater.

[7] An interesting feature of this argument is that all of its premises are necessarily true if

true at all. (1) is the assumption from which Anselm means to deduce a contradiction. (2) is

a premise, and presumably necessarily true in Anselm's view; and (3) is the only remaining

premise (the other items are consequences of preceding steps); it says of some other

proposition (God exists) that it is possible. Propositions which thus ascribe a modality --

possibility, necessity, contingency -- to another proposition are themselves either

necessarily true or necessarily false. So all the premises of the argument are, if true at all,

necessarily true. And hence if the premises of this argument are true, then [provided that

(6) is really inconsistent] a contradiction can be deduced from (1) together with necessary

propositions; this means that (1) entails a contradiction and is, therefore, necessarily false.

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The Ontological Argument

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1. Kant's Objection

[8] The most famous and important objection to the ontological argument is contained in

Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason . Kant begins his criticism as follows:

If, in an identical proposition, we reject the predicate while retaining the subject,

contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the

latter. But if we reject the subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for

nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its

three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the

triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an

absolutely necessary being. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with

all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise. There is nothing

outside it that would then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing is not

supposed to be derived from anything external; nor is there anything internal that

would be contradicted, since in rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time

rejected all its internal properties. "God is omnipotent" is a necessary judgment. The

omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a Deity, that is, an infinite being; for the

two concepts are identical. But if we say "There is no God," neither the omnipotence

nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with

the subject, and there is therefore not the least contradiction in such a judgment...

For I cannot form the least concept of a thing which, should it be rejected with all its

predicates, leaves behind a contradiction.

[9] One characteristic feature of Anselm's argument, as we have seen, is that if successful,

it establishes that God exists is a necessary proposition. Here Kant is apparently arguing

that no existential proposition -- one that asserts the existence of something or other -- is

necessarily true; the reason, he says, is that no contra-existential (the denial of an

existential) is contradictory or inconsistent. But in which of our several senses of

inconsistent? What he means to say, I believe, is that no existential proposition is necessary

in the broadly logical sense. And this claim has been popular with philosophers ever since.

But why, exactly, does Kant think it's true? What is the argument? When we take a careful

look at the purported reasoning, it looks pretty unimpressive; it's hard to make out an

argument at all. The conclusion would apparently be this: if we deny the existence of

something or other, we can't be contradicting ourselves; no existential proposition is

necessary and no contra-existential is impossible. Why not? Well, if we say, for example,

that God does not exist, then says Kant, "There is nothing outside it (i.e., God) that would

then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing is not supposed to be derived from

anything external; nor is there anything internal that would be contradicted, since in

rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time rejected all its internal properties."

[10] But how is this even relevant? The claim is that God does not exist can't be necessarily

false. What could be meant, in this context, by saying that there's nothing "outside of" God

that would be contradicted if we denied His existence? What would contradict a proposition

like God does not exist is some other proposition -- God does exist , for example. Kant

seems to think that if the proposition in question were necessarily false, it would have to

contradict, not a proposition, but some object external to God -- or else contradict some

internal part or aspect or property of God. But this certainly looks like confusion; it is

propositions that contradict each other; they aren't contradicted by objects or parts, aspects

or properties of objects. Does he mean instead to be speaking of propositions about things

external to God, or about his aspects or parts or properties? But clearly many such

Alvin Plantinga

The Ontological Argument

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propositions do contradict God does not exist ; an example would be the world was created

by God . Does he mean to say that no true proposition contradicts God does not exist? No,

for that would be to affirm the nonexistence of God, an affirmation Kant is by no means

prepared to make.

[11] So this passage is an enigma. Either Kant was confused or else he expressed himself

very badly indeed. And either way we don't have any argument for the claim that contra-

existential propositions can't be inconsistent. This passage seems to be no more than an

elaborate and confused way of asserting this claim.

[12] The heart of Kant's objection to the ontological argument, however, is contained in the

following passage:

"Being" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something

which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing,

or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the

copula of a judgment. The proposition "God is omnipotent" contains two concepts,

each of which has its object -- God and omnipotence . The small word "is" adds no

new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If,

now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is

omnipotence), and say "God is," or "There is a God," we attach no new predicate to

the concept of God, but only posit it as an object that stands in relation to my

concept. The content of both must be one and the same; nothing can have been

added to the concept, which expresses merely what is possible, by my thinking its

object (through the expression "it is") as given absolutely. Otherwise stated, the real

contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred real thalers does not contain

the least coin more than a hundred possible thalers. For as the latter signify the

concept and the former the object and the positing of the concept, should the former

contain more than the latter, my concept would not, in that case, express the whole

object, and would not therefore be an adequate concept of it. My financial position,

however, is affected very differently by a hundred real thalers than it is by the mere

concept of them (that is, of the possibility). For the object, as it actually exists, is not

analytically contained in my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a

determination of my state) synthetically; and yet the conceived hundred thalers are

not themselves in the least increased through thus acquiring existence outside my

concept.

By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing -- even if we

completely determine it -- we do not make the least addition to the thing when we

further declare that this thing is. Otherwise it would not be exactly the same thing

that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept: and we could

not, therefore, say that the object of my concept exists. If we think in a thing every

feature of reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my saying that this

defective thing exists.

[13] Now how, exactly is all this relevant to Anselm's argument? Perhaps Kant means to

make point that we could put by saying that it's not possible to define things into existence.

(People sometimes suggest that the ontological argument is just such an attempt to define

God into existence.) And this claim is somehow connected with Kant's famous but

perplexing dictum that being (or existence) is not a real predicate or property. But how shall

we understand Kant here? What does it mean to say that existence isn't (or is) a real

property?

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The Ontological Argument

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[14] Apparently Kant thinks this is equivalent to or follows from what he puts variously as

"the real contains no more than the merely possible"; "the content of both (i.e., concept

and object) must be one and the same"; "being is not the concept of something that could

be added to the concept of thing," and so on. But what does all this mean? And how does it

bear on the ontological argument? Perhaps Kant is thinking along the following lines. In

defining a concept -- bachelor, let's say, or prime number -- one lists a number of

properties that are severally necessary and jointly sufficient for the concept's applying to

something. That is, the concept applies to a given thing only if that thing has each of the

listed properties, and if thing does have them all, then the concept in question applies to it.

So, for example, to define the concept bachelor we list such properties as being unmarried,

being male, being over the age of twenty-five, and the like. Take any one of these

properties: a thing is a bachelor only if it has it, and if a thing has all of them, then it follows

that it is a bachelor.

[15] Now suppose you have a concept C that has application contingently if at all. That is to

say, it is not necessarily true that there are things to which this concept applies. The

concept bachelor would be an example; the proposition there are bachelors , while true, is

obviously not necessarily true. And suppose P1, P2, ... , Pn , are the properties jointly

sufficient and severally necessary for something's falling under C . Then C can be defined as

follows:

A thing x is an instance of C (i.e., C applies to x ) if and only if x has P1, P2, ..., Pn.

[16] Perhaps Kant's point is this. There is a certain kind of mistake here we may be tempted

to make. Suppose P1..., Pn are the defining properties for the concept bachelor. We might

try to define a new concept superbachelor by adding existence to P1 ,...,Pn . That is, we

might say

x is a superbachelor if and only if x has P1 - Pn , and x exists.

[17] Then (as we might mistakenly suppose) just as it is a necessary truth that bachelors

are unmarried, so it is a necessary truth that superbachelors exist. And in this way it looks

as if we've defined super-bachelors into existence.

[18] But of course this is a mistake, and perhaps that is Kant's point. For while indeed it is a

necessary truth that bachelors are unmarried, what this means is that the proposition

(8) Everything that is a bachelor is unmarried

is necessarily true.

[19] Similarly, then,

(9) Everything that is a superbachelor exists

will be necessarily true. But obviously it doesn't follow that there are any superbachelors. All

that follows is that

(10) All the superbachelors there are exist.

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