Nadelhoffer; On The Importance of Saying Only What You Believe in the Socratic Dialogues.pdf

On The Importance of Saying Only What You Believe in the Socratic Dialogues

Thomas Nadelhoffer

Introduction:

On several occasions during the so-called Socratic dialogues, we find Socrates

admonishing his interlocutors to say—or assent to— only things that they honestly believe

to be true . Socrates seems so adamant about this “demand for sincerity” 1 that at least one

commentator has gone so far as to call it a “standing rule” of the Socratic elenchus that is

“generally taken for granted, mentioned only when there is a special need to bring it to

the interlocutor’s notice.” 2 However, there are a few occasions where Socrates curiously

proceeds without the interlocutor’s genuine assent to the propositions under discussion—

e.g. with Protagoras ( Pr . 333b-c), with Callicles ( G . 499b4-c6, 501c7-8, and from 505c5

on), and with Thrasymachus ( R. I. 349a9-b1 and from 350e1 and on). In this essay, I am

going to offer an explanation of Socrates’ occasional willingness to wave what Vlastos

calls the “say what you believe” requirement. 3 In doing so, I will first briefly discuss the

methods and goals of the Socratic elenchus in order to get a clear picture of Socrates’

motivation for insisting that interlocutors advance only theses they sincerely believe (§I),

before examining the passages where Socrates either fails to enforce the honesty clause

or explicitly waives it altogether (§II). Then, after considering how two commentators—

viz. Gregory Vlastos and John Beversluis—have unsuccessfully attempted to explain

Socrates’ inconsistent behavior (§III), I will present my own analysis of his puzzling

inconsistency (§IV).

I: The Socratic Elenchus—Method and Goal

On Socrates’ view, philosophizing is the activity of examining and investigating

not only our beliefs, but the lives we lead as well. 4 Viewing himself as a gadfly “attached

to the city by the gods” (Ap. 28e), Socrates goes around Athens trying to persuade people

to care about the state of their souls and to live virtuously (Ap. 30b). It is in carrying out

this mission that we find him using the elenctic method to cross-examine interlocutors

(Ap. 29e-30a). And he makes it clear that he intends to do more than just show the

interlocutors that some of their beliefs are inconsistent. Socrates wants them to give an

account of the way they live their lives (R. I. 352d). 5 After all, by his lights, it is not that

unexamined beliefs are not worth having, but that “the unexamined life is not worth

living” (Ap. 38a).

Keeping this in mind, it should come as no surprise that we find Socrates insisting

that his interlocutors say only what they genuinely believe to be true. It is because he

wants the interlocutors to give an account of their lives that Socrates exhorts them never

to answer contrary to their real opinion. 6 Thus, on several occasions during the

dialogues—e.g. R. I, 346a & 350e, Pr. 331c, G. 495a-b & 500b, Cr. 49d—we find

Socrates admonishing the interlocutor to only say things they really believe. By his

lights, if an interlocutor is to give an account of his life, then he must say only things that

he genuinely believes to be true.

So, the “say what you believe” requirement serves at least two closely related

functions: On the one hand, by making this a guiding principle of the elenctic method,

Socrates helps distinguish his own method of cross-examination from the purely eristic

method of the Sophists—for whom the sole purpose of an argument is to win, regardless

of the truth of the respective positions. According to Socrates, one of the shortcomings

of eristic is that it seems wholly ineffective in persuading people that they ought to

devote themselves to wisdom and virtue (See, e.g., Eu. 277a-e). So, in order to avoid the

pitfalls of eristic and to distance himself from the Sophists, Socrates demands sincerity

from his interlocutors.

On the other hand, the requirement ensures that in refuting his interlocutors’

claims, Socrates will at the same time be reproaching them for the way they conduct their

lives. For, as we saw earlier, if the interlocutors have answered honestly—and answering

honestly is a necessary condition for giving an account of one’s life—then Socrates can

hold them accountable for both the answers they give and the lives they lead. This latter

reason is the primary motivation for Socrates’ refusal to proceed with premises that the

interlocutors don’t accept. After all, as Vlastos pointedly asks, “How could Socrates

hope to get you to give, sooner or later, an account of your life, if he did not require you

to state your personal opinion on the question under debate?” 7 Thus, in keeping true to

his maxim that the “unexamined life is not worth living,” Socrates imposes the “say what

you believe” requirement in order to insure that the interlocutors are forced to give an

account of their lives.

II: Waiving the Rule

If the analysis of the methods and goals of the elenchus presented in the preceding

section is correct, then it becomes difficult to understand why Socrates is ever willing to

dispense with the “say what you believe” requirement. And because the requirement

seemingly plays such a pivotal role in the elenctic method we should pay close attention

to the passages where Socrates either fails to enforce it or waives it altogether:

T1)

Socrates: “Nonetheless, we mustn’t shrink from pursuing the argument and looking into

this, just as long as I take you to be saying what you really think. And I believe that you

aren’t joking now, Thrasymachus, but are saying what you believe to be the truth.”

Thrasymachus: “What difference does it make to you, whether I believe it or not? It’s

my account you’re supposed to be refuting.” S.: “It makes no difference” ( R . I, 349a).

T2)

Thrasymachus (T): “So either allow me to speak, or, if you want to ask questions go

ahead, and I’ll say, “All right,” and nod yes and no, as one does to old wives' tales.”

Socrates (S): “Don’t do that contrary to your own opinion.” T.: “I’ll answer so as to

please you, since you won’t let me make my speech. What else do you want?” S.:

“Nothing by God. But if that’s what you are going to do, go ahead and do it. I’ll ask my

questions” ( R. I, 350e).

T3)

Socrates (S): “So, does someone who acts unjustly seem temperate to you in that he acts

unjustly?” Protagoras (P): “I would be ashamed to say that is so, Socrates, although many

people do say it.” S.: Then shall I address myself to them or to you?” Pr.: “If you like,

why don’t you debate the majority position first?” S.: “It makes no difference to me

provided you give the answers, whether it is your own opinion or not. I am primarily

interested in testing the argument, although it may happen both that the questioner,

myself, and my respondent wind up being tested” ( Pr. 333b-c).

T4)

Socrates (S): “What’s this Protagoras? Will you not say yes or no to my question?”

Protagoras (P): “Answer it yourself.” S.: “I have only one more question to ask you. Do

you still believe, as you did at first, that some men are extremely ignorant and yet still

courageous?” Pr.: “I think you just want to win the argument, Socrates, and that is why

you are forcing me to answer. So I will gratify you and say that, on the basis of what we

have agreed upon, it seems to me to be impossible” ( Pr. 360d-e)

T5)

Socrates: “As for you, do you join us in subscribing to the same opinion on these matters

or do you dissent from it?” Callicles: “No, I won’t dissent. I’m going along with you,

both to expedite your argument and to gratify Gorgias here” ( G. 501c).

T6)

Socrates: “Who else is willing? Surely we mustn’t leave the discussion incomplete.”

Callicles: “Couldn’t you go through the discussion by yourself, either by speaking in your

own person or by answering your own questions?” ( G. 505d-e)

Why would someone whose stated goal is to force the citizens of Athens to give an

account of their lives, ever allow them to say things that they do not truly believe—

especially when he has already admonished them earlier in the dialogue for being

insincere? Yet, as T1-T6 show, Socrates proceeds without the sincere assent of these

three interlocutors no less than six times—more times, in fact, than he invokes the

requirement in all of the dialogues . 8 Indeed, the only interlocutor who is actually held to

the requirement after having been informed of its importance is Crito.

Take, for instance, Socrates’ exchange with Thrasymachus. Given that Socrates

has already reprimanded him for saying things he doesn’t believe, when we hear

Thrasymachus ask, “What difference does it make to you, whether I believe it or not?

It’s my account you’re supposed to be refuting,” we understandably expect Socrates to

say that it makes all the difference . Especially given that, by Socrates’ lights, the primary

goal of the elenchus is to examine the interlocutors’ lives as well as their beliefs. Yet,

Socrates surprisingly says, “It makes no difference at all,” thereby explicitly waiving the

“say what you believe” requirement after having just invoked it . And this is not an

isolated case. Socrates behaves the very same way with Protagoras and Callicles, both of

whom give Socrates the answers he wants to hear solely and explicitly in an effort to

placate him and to appease the bystanders (See, e.g. T5 and T6). So, what sense are we

to make of these passages? Although T1-T6 have escaped the notice of most

commentators, Vlastos and Beversluis each offer explanations of why Socrates is

sometimes willing to proceed without his interlocutors’ sincere assent. Now we must

turn our attention to their accounts.

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