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Race & Class
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The Vietnam War in the age of Orwell
Noam Chomsky
Race Class
1984; 25; 41
DOI: 10.1177/030639688402500404
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NOAM CHOMSKY
The Vietnam War in the age
of Orwell
Whatever its merits as history, Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam: a history* is
an important cultural event. The book is identified as ’a Companion to
the PBS Television Series’ intended for the schools as well as the
general public. It has been praised as ’more objective’ than the ’angry’
and ’dogmatic’ earlier work of partisans (Douglas Pike) and as a
’dispassionate and fair-minded’ analysis by ’a critic of the war’ (Leslie
Gelb); and its reliance on ’new scholarship’ and interviews is alleged to
have produced ’surprising new facts and interpretations’ that under-
mine the arguments of ’antiwar writers’ (Fox Butterfield, who regards
Pike as one of the major figures in the ’new scholarships Its influence
is guaranteed.
The enthusiastic reception also provides some insight into the cur-
rent ideological scene. For many Americans, the Vietnam experience
challenged familiar precepts about American benevolence and com-
mitment to self-determination and justice. The erosion of this theology
is a threat to the freedom of the state to engage in subversion, violence
and terror, and cannot be countenanced. It was always obvious that
the actual history would have to be reshaped so that the state could ex-
ercise its essential functions without the impediment of a dissident
public. Karnow’s Companion volume and its reception deserves
careful scrutiny for what it reveals concerning the progress of this
enterprise.
Noam Chomsky is Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
author most recently of The Fateful Triangle (Boston, South End Press 1982; London,
Pluto Press, 1984).
*Stanley Karnow, Vietnam a history (New York, Viking Press, 1983).
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The ideal history will depict the US war as a failed crusade, inspired
by ’an excess of righteousness and disinterested benevolence’, to bor-
row the words of John K. Fairbank in his December 1968 presidential
address to the American Historical Society, referring to the Vietnam
‘disaster’.2 It will depict the war as a defence of South Vietnam against
aggression from the North backed by the Soviet Union - China having
lost its former role as ’the more aggressive of the Communist powers’,
as Henry Kissinger regarded it in 1969, with characteristic insight. It
will denounce communist barbarism and American errors; French col-
onialism is also a legitimate target and the practices of the Saigon
regime (corruption, torture, etc.) may also be condemned as il-
lustrating Asian values, so different from our own. The domestic op-
position to the war must be characterised as emotional, extremist, and
also as having impeded the search for peace by far-sighted and respon-
sible leaders; nothing is more dangerous than to leave in place the
understanding that a disobedient public can play a role in decision-
making, often, by posing a domestic threat to power and privilege. In
particular, resistance to the war on the part of the young must be
denigrated. In pursuit of these ends, this ideal history must avoid any
serious discussion of what actually happened to the peasant societies of
Indochina, particularly South Vietnam, the prime object of our
solicitude. It must also strictly avoid the documentary record, for ob-
vious reasons.
This ideal history should, however, take a critical stance towards US
policy and practices while abiding by the principles just outlined. A
sophisticated propaganda system does not use the bludgeon to enforce
its doctrines. Rather, these become the presuppositions of debate
among right-thinking people. Once the terms are set, the most free and
critical discussion should be encouraged so as to entrench these prin-
ciples more deeply, and nothing is more helpful than a critical posture
-
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always incorporating the basic doctrines of the faith.
We learn a good deal about the ideological climate by asking how
closely Karnow’s widely-heralded history approximates to the ideal.
The critical acclaim is in part merited. Thus Pike is quite correct in
saying that Karnow avoids the hysterical ranting of some earlier work.
He does not wail about ’Cinderella and all the other fools [who] could
still believe there was magic in the mature world if one mumbled the
secret incantation: solidarity, union, concord’, or about the ’gullible,
misled people’ who were ’turning the countryside into a bedlam, toppl-
ing one Saigon government after another, confounding the
Americans’, with their absurd faith that ’the meek, at last, were to in-
herit the earth’ and that ’justice and virtue’ could triumph (Douglas
Pike, the leading government specialist on the ’Vietcong’, in 1966).3
However, the book leaves all serious questions unanswered, it contains
little that is ’new or surprising’, and that little is presented without
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credible evidence. Karnow for the most part avoids both old and new
scholarship as well as the rich documentary record, and often
misrepresents the sources listed (there are no direct references). In fact,
these 700 pages skirt not only the issues but also the bare facts of the
American war in Indochina. After a survey of earlier history, the book
presents an impressionistic and superficial account of the American
war, framed within the assumptions of the US government propagan-
da system, though critical of American errors and occasional excesses
in a noble cause. It is, in short, exactly the kind of work that one would
expect to be canonised as ’objective history’, at least for the general
public.
In Orwell’s 1984, Winston Smith desperately attempts to hold on to
the truth that 2 + 2 = 4, and fails as he succumbs to Big Brother. In the
case of the Indochina war, 2 + 2 = 4 is the fact that, after taking over
from the French in 1954-5, the US undermined the political settlement
arranged at the Geneva conference and organised a violent campaign
of state terrorism against the anti-French resistance (the Vietminh,
relabelled with the pejorative term ’Vietcong’) in the south, virtually
decimating it. When the terror finally evoked resistance, the US client
regime faced collapse and in 1961-2 US military forces began their
direct attack against the rural society - some 85 per cent of the popula-
tion at the time - with extensive bombardment and defoliation. The
general plan, Karnow observes, ’was to corral peasants into armed
stockades, thereby depriving the Vietcong of their support’ (255). This
is what we correctly call ’aggression’ when it is conducted by an official
enemy, the Russians in Afghanistan, for example. Continuing to block
all attempts at peaceful settlement, including the offer of the NLF
(’Vietcong’) to neutralise South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the US
then expanded the war in 1964, and in early 1965, finding no other way
to avoid political settlement, undertook a war of annihilation that
spread throughout Indochina, with South Vietnam always bearing the
major brunt of the American assault. An unprecedented popular pro-
test raised the domestic costs of the war. In January 1973, Nixon and
Kissinger were compelled to accept provisions similar to the NLF pro-
gramme of the early 1960s, though only formally, since they announc-
ed at once that the US would reject all the provisions of the scrap of
paper it had signed and continue the war to impose its rule over South
Vietnam, as it did, leading finally to a Communist response and the
collapse of the Saigon regime.
This much is 2 + 2 = 4. It is plainly unacceptable as history. The facts
are difficult to disguise, and one will find a few relevant ones scattered
through Karnow’s history (’In the south’, former chairman of the
Joint Chiefs Thomas Moorer explained, ’we had to cope with women
concealing grenades in their brassieres, or in their baby’s diapers’; the
’special tension’ of Vietnam was that ’every peasant might be a
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Vietcong terrorist’ - i.e., someone resisting US aggression; Karnow’s
closest friends in Vietnam turned out to be underground VC agents:
16, 26, 38). But the true story must not be known and is effectively
obscured here.
Still more must be obscured, namely, the fact that US support for
France and then direct aggression was motivated by concern over the
strategic resources of Southeast Asia and their significance for the
global system that the US was then constructing, incorporating western
Europe and Japan. It was feared that successful independent develop-
ment under a radical nationalist leadership in Vietnam might ’cause the
rot to spread’, gradually eroding US dominance in the region and
ultimately causing Japan, the largest domino, to join in a closed system
from which the US would be excluded. Documentation concerning this
matter is by now extensive, and it has been widely discussed since the
issue was raised by the well-known American historian Walter LaFeber
in 1968, both in the critical literature on the war and in mainstream
professional journals.4 The idea that US global planners had national
imperialist motives is intolerable to the doctrinal system, so this topic
must be avoided in any history directed to a popular audience, and the
documentation now available must be suppressed, for example, the
early and critically important National Security memoranda.5 Kar-
now’s ’history’ also satisfies these conditions, and in fact offers no
plausible account of the background for US policy, and no evidence
for the more tolerable version he favours.
For Karnow, the American war was ’a failed crusade’ undertaken
for motives that were ’noble’ though ’illusory’, and with ’the loftiest
intentions’ (9, 439). While orating in this style, Karnow gives a very
partial review of the evidence that the Diem regime was simply our
’surrogate’ (214) in Vietnam (and its successors, merely a fig leaf for
aggression) while the majority of the South Vietnamese population was
the target of our attack. Disregarding these facts, he concludes that we
were, throughout, fighting ’to defend South Vietnam’s independence’
(650); President Johnson, Karnow assures us, pursued the search of
Eisenhower and Kennedy for ’an independent South Vietnam’ (377).
By similar logic, the Russians are now fighting to defend the in-
dependence of Afghanistan against terrorists supported from abroad.
This conception makes perfect sense if we understand ’independent’
to mean ’dependent on the US’. In the interests of such independence,
the US had to undermine the 1954 Geneva agreement and block all
subsequent proposals for neutralisation or political settlement, and to
ensure that there would be no political participation on the part of
what even Pike conceded to be the only ’mass-based political party’ in
South Vietnam, the NLF, or the only other organised political force,
the Buddhists, who were not ’acting in the interests of the Nation’
(General Westmoreland) and were ’equivalent to card-carrying
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