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The Vietnam War in the age of Orwell
Noam Chomsky
Race Class
1984; 25; 41
DOI: 10.1177/030639688402500404
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© 1984 Institute of Race Relations. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or
unauthorized distribution.
NOAM
CHOMSKY
The Vietnam War in the
age
of Orwell
Whatever
its merits
as
history, Stanley
Karnow’s
Vietnam:
a
history*
is
an
important
cultural
event.
The
book is identified
as
’a
Companion
to
the
PBS
Television
Series’ intended for
the
schools
as
well
as
the
general
public.
It has been
praised
as
’more
objective’
than the
’angry’
and
’dogmatic’
earlier
work of
partisans (Douglas
Pike)
and
as
a
’dispassionate
and
fair-minded’
analysis by
’a
critic
of the
war’
(Leslie
Gelb);
and its reliance
on
’new
scholarship’
and interviews
is
alleged
to
have
produced ’surprising
new
facts and
interpretations’
that under-
mine
the
arguments
of ’antiwar writers’
(Fox
Butterfield,
who
regards
Pike
as one
of
the
major figures
in the ’new
scholarships
Its influence
is
guaranteed.
The enthusiastic
reception
also
provides
some
insight
into the
cur-
rent
ideological
scene.
For
many
Americans,
the Vietnam
experience
challenged
familiar
precepts
about American benevolence and
com-
mitment
to
self-determination
and
justice.
The
erosion
of
this
theology
is
a
threat
to
the
freedom of
the
state to
engage
in
subversion,
violence
and
terror,
and
cannot
be
countenanced.
It
was
always
obvious that
the
actual
history
would have
to
be
reshaped
so
that the
state
could
ex-
ercise its essential
functions without the
impediment
of
a
dissident
public.
Karnow’s
Companion
volume
and
its
reception
deserves
careful
scrutiny
for what it reveals
concerning
the
progress
of
this
enterprise.
Noam
Chomsky
is
Institute
Professor
at
the Massachusetts Institute
of
Technology,
and
author
most
recently
of The
Fateful Triangle (Boston,
South End Press
1982; London,
Pluto
Press,
1984).
*Stanley
Karnow,
Vietnam
a
history (New York,
Viking
Press, 1983).
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42
The ideal
history
will
depict
the US
war as
a
failed
crusade, inspired
by
’an
excess
of
righteousness
and disinterested
benevolence’,
to
bor-
row
the words
of
John K.
Fairbank in his
December 1968
presidential
address
to
the American Historical
Society, referring
to
the
Vietnam
‘disaster’.2
It
will
depict
the
war as a
defence of South Vietnam
against
aggression
from the North backed
by
the Soviet Union - China
having
lost its former role
as
’the
more
aggressive
of the Communist
powers’,
as
Henry
Kissinger
regarded
it in
1969,
with characteristic
insight.
It
will denounce communist barbarism and
American
errors;
French col-
onialism
is also
a
legitimate
target
and the
practices
of the
Saigon
regime (corruption,
torture,
etc.)
may
also be
condemned
as
il-
lustrating
Asian
values,
so
different from
our own.
The domestic
op-
position
to
the
war
must
be characterised
as
emotional, extremist,
and
also
as
having impeded
the search for
peace
by
far-sighted
and
respon-
sible
leaders;
nothing
is
more
dangerous
than
to
leave in
place
the
understanding
that
a
disobedient
public
can
play a
role in decision-
making,
often,
by posing
a
domestic
threat
to
power
and
privilege.
In
particular,
resistance
to
the
war on
the
part
of the
young
must
be
denigrated.
In
pursuit
of
these
ends,
this ideal
history
must
avoid
any
serious discussion
of what
actually happened
to
the
peasant
societies
of
Indochina,
particularly
South
Vietnam,
the
prime object
of
our
solicitude. It
must
also
strictly
avoid the
documentary
record,
for ob-
vious
reasons.
This ideal
history
should, however,
take
a
critical
stance
towards US
policy
and
practices
while
abiding
by
the
principles just
outlined.
A
sophisticated
propaganda
system
does
not
use
the
bludgeon
to
enforce
its
doctrines.
Rather,
these
become the
presuppositions
of debate
among
right-thinking people.
Once the
terms
are
set,
the
most
free and
critical
discussion should be
encouraged
so
as
to
entrench these
prin-
ciples
more
deeply,
and
nothing
is
more
helpful
than
a
critical
posture
-
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© 1984 Institute of Race Relations. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or
unauthorized distribution.
always incorporating
the basic doctrines of the faith.
We learn
a
good
deal
about the
ideological
climate
by
asking
how
closely
Karnow’s
widely-heralded history
approximates
to
the
ideal.
The
critical acclaim is
in
part
merited. Thus Pike is
quite
correct
in
saying
that Karnow avoids the
hysterical ranting
of
some
earlier work.
He does
not
wail about ’Cinderella and all the other fools
[who]
could
still believe there
was
magic
in the
mature
world if
one
mumbled
the
secret
incantation:
solidarity,
union, concord’,
or
about the
’gullible,
misled
people’
who
were
’turning
the
countryside
into
a
bedlam,
toppl-
ing
one
Saigon
government
after
another,
confounding
the
Americans’,
with
their
absurd faith that ’the
meek,
at
last,
were
to
in-
herit the earth’ and that
’justice
and virtue’ could
triumph (Douglas
Pike,
the
leading
government
specialist
on
the
’Vietcong’,
in
1966).3
However,
the book
leaves all serious
questions
unanswered,
it contains
little that is ’new
or
surprising’,
and that
little is
presented
without
43
credible evidence.
Karnow for the
most
part
avoids both old and
new
scholarship
as
well
as
the rich
documentary
record,
and often
misrepresents
the
sources
listed
(there
are
no
direct
references).
In
fact,
these 700
pages
skirt
not
only
the
issues
but also the bare facts of the
American
war
in
Indochina. After
a
survey
of earlier
history,
the book
presents
an
impressionistic
and
superficial
account
of the American
war,
framed
within the
assumptions
of the US
government
propagan-
da
system,
though
critical of American
errors
and occasional
excesses
in
a
noble
cause.
It
is,
in
short, exactly
the kind of work that
one
would
expect
to
be
canonised
as
’objective
history’,
at
least for
the
general
public.
In Orwell’s
1984,
Winston Smith
desperately
attempts
to
hold
on
to
the truth that
2 + 2 = 4,
and fails
as
he succumbs
to
Big
Brother. In the
case
of the Indochina
war,
2 + 2 = 4 is
the fact
that,
after
taking
over
from
the
French in
1954-5,
the US undermined the
political
settlement
arranged
at
the
Geneva conference and
organised
a
violent
campaign
of
state
terrorism
against
the anti-French resistance
(the
Vietminh,
relabelled
with
the
pejorative
term
’Vietcong’)
in
the
south,
virtually
decimating
it. When the
terror
finally
evoked
resistance,
the US client
regime
faced
collapse
and in 1961-2 US
military
forces
began
their
direct attack
against
the rural
society -
some
85
per
cent
of
the
popula-
tion
at
the time -
with
extensive bombardment
and
defoliation.
The
general plan,
Karnow
observes,
’was
to
corral
peasants
into armed
stockades,
thereby depriving
the
Vietcong
of their
support’
(255).
This
is what
we
correctly
call
’aggression’
when
it
is conducted
by
an
official
enemy,
the Russians in
Afghanistan,
for
example. Continuing
to
block
all
attempts
at
peaceful
settlement, including
the offer of the NLF
(’Vietcong’)
to
neutralise South
Vietnam,
Laos
and
Cambodia,
the
US
then
expanded
the
war
in
1964,
and
in
early 1965,
finding
no
other
way
to
avoid
political
settlement,
undertook
a
war
of annihilation that
spread
throughout
Indochina,
with South Vietnam
always bearing
the
major
brunt of the American
assault.
An
unprecedented popular
pro-
test
raised the
domestic
costs
of the
war.
In
January 1973,
Nixon
and
Kissinger
were
compelled
to
accept
provisions
similar
to
the NLF
pro-
gramme
of the
early
1960s,
though
only formally,
since
they
announc-
ed
at
once
that the US would
reject
all the
provisions
of the
scrap
of
paper
it had
signed
and
continue
the
war
to
impose
its rule
over
South
Vietnam,
as
it
did,
leading
finally
to
a
Communist
response
and the
collapse
of the
Saigon
regime.
This much is 2
+
2
=
4. It is
plainly unacceptable
as
history.
The facts
are
difficult
to
disguise,
and
one
will find
a
few relevant
ones
scattered
through
Karnow’s
history
(’In
the
south’,
former chairman of the
Joint Chiefs Thomas Moorer
explained,
’we had
to
cope
with
women
concealing
grenades
in their
brassieres,
or
in their
baby’s
diapers’;
the
’special
tension’
of
Vietnam
was
that
’every
peasant
might
be
a
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44
Vietcong
terrorist’ -
i.e.,
someone
resisting
US
aggression;
Karnow’s
closest friends
in Vietnam
turned
out to
be
underground
VC
agents:
16, 26, 38).
But the
true
story
must not
be known and
is
effectively
obscured here.
Still
more
must
be
obscured,
namely,
the fact that US
support
for
France and then
direct
aggression
was
motivated
by
concern over
the
strategic
resources
of
Southeast
Asia
and
their
significance
for
the
global
system
that the
US
was
then
constructing,
incorporating
western
Europe
and
Japan.
It
was
feared
that
successful
independent
develop-
ment
under
a
radical
nationalist
leadership
in
Vietnam
might
’cause the
rot to
spread’, gradually
eroding
US
dominance
in the
region
and
ultimately
causing
Japan,
the
largest
domino,
to
join
in
a
closed
system
from
which
the US
would
be
excluded. Documentation
concerning
this
matter
is
by
now
extensive,
and
it has been
widely
discussed
since the
issue
was
raised
by
the well-known
American
historian Walter LaFeber
in
1968,
both in the
critical
literature
on
the
war
and
in
mainstream
professional
journals.4
The
idea
that US
global planners
had national
imperialist
motives is intolerable
to
the
doctrinal
system,
so
this
topic
must
be
avoided in
any
history
directed
to
a
popular
audience,
and the
documentation
now
available
must
be
suppressed,
for
example,
the
early
and
critically
important
National
Security
memoranda.5 Kar-
now’s
’history’
also satisfies
these
conditions,
and
in
fact offers
no
plausible
account
of the
background
for US
policy,
and
no
evidence
for the
more
tolerable version
he favours.
For
Karnow,
the American
war was
’a
failed
crusade’
undertaken
for
motives that
were
’noble’
though
’illusory’,
and
with ’the
loftiest
intentions’
(9,
439).
While
orating
in this
style,
Karnow
gives
a
very
partial
review
of
the
evidence
that the Diem
regime
was
simply
our
’surrogate’
(214)
in
Vietnam
(and
its
successors,
merely
a
fig
leaf for
aggression)
while
the
majority
of the
South
Vietnamese
population
was
the
target
of
our
attack.
Disregarding
these
facts,
he
concludes
that
we
were,
throughout, fighting
’to
defend
South
Vietnam’s
independence’
(650);
President
Johnson,
Karnow
assures
us,
pursued
the search of
Eisenhower
and
Kennedy
for
’an
independent
South
Vietnam’
(377).
By
similar
logic,
the Russians
are
now
fighting
to
defend
the in-
dependence
of
Afghanistan against
terrorists
supported
from abroad.
This
conception
makes
perfect
sense
if
we
understand
’independent’
to
mean
’dependent
on
the US’. In the
interests
of such
independence,
the US had
to
undermine the 1954 Geneva
agreement
and
block all
subsequent proposals
for neutralisation
or
political
settlement,
and
to
ensure
that there would be
no
political participation
on
the
part
of
what
even
Pike
conceded
to
be the
only
’mass-based
political
party’
in
South
Vietnam,
the
NLF,
or
the
only
other
organised
political
force,
the
Buddhists,
who
were
not
’acting
in the interests of the
Nation’
(General Westmoreland)
and
were
’equivalent
to
card-carrying
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© 1984 Institute of Race Relations. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or
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