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OPTIMAL BETTING STRATEGIES FOR SIMULTANEOUS GAMES
ANDREW GRANT , DAVID JOHNSTONE, AND OH KANG KWON
Discipline of Finance H69, The University of Sydney, Sydney NSW 2006, Australia
[a.grant, d.johnstone, o.kwon]@econ.usyd.edu.au
Abstract. We consider the problem of optimal betting on simultaneous games when the book-
maker accepts bets on the joint outcome of those events, called parlays, accumulators or multibets.
When the bookmaker’s take is a xed proportion of the amount wagered, multibetting dominates
whatever the bettor’s utility function. When, more commonly, the bookmaker sets multiplicative
payouts, and hence takes a higher percentage on multibets than single bets, the optimal betting
strategy depends on the bettor’s utility function. We consider the case of a log utility (Kelly)
bettor, and nd optimal betting fractions under both forms of bookmaker take. A consequence of
these results is that when the bookmaker oers multiplicative payouts, a Kelly bettor’s expected
payout is the same whether the games are simultaneous or sequential.
1.
Introduction
Betting markets are growing rapidly and are no longer distinct even supercially from other
investment markets. The British-based on-line nancial market-maker IG Markets oers “binary
bets” on whether the London Stock Exchange goes up or down on the day, and brokers 3 million
trades per year at bid and ask prices quoted continuously during the day. Levitt (2004) notes that
turnover of the four major British bookmakers in 2002 exceeded £10 billion. Most betting is on
sports events such as football games but other events such as elections, the Academy Awards, Nobel
Prizes, poker tournaments, and essentially anything with an uncertain outcome, is the subject of
international betting.
As the size and liquidity of betting markets grow, long standing questions about their economic
e ciency and potentially protable betting strategies become more important. To test whether
gambling markets are ine cient in the sense that they yield positive abnormal returns, it is neces-
sary to design optimal betting portfolios. Most previous discussion of gambling strategies has been
conned to a subculture of mathematicians and professional gamblers, for example Thorp (2000)
Date : Current version: February 15, 2007.
Corresponding Author.
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A. GRANT, D. JOHNSTONE, AND O. KWON
and MacLean, Ziemba and Blazenko (1992). There is, however, an increasing awareness of the
theoretical, practical and linguistic parallels between gambling and other methods of investment
(cf. Levitt (2004), p223-224). The nance textbook by Luenberger (1998) presents the nancial
theory of investments as eectively an overriding theory of gambling.
This paper is concerned with the problem of how to bet optimally on two or more activities or
“games” at the same time. We use the term “game” generally to describe the sports event, chess
game, political election, stock market movement or whatever other activity is being bet upon. The
term “game” is therefore not to be taken literally, although such a narrow focus would not alter
the relevance of our ndings. We regard “game” as a better term than “event” because an event
can be thought of as either an activity such as a tennis match or as the outcome of that activity,
and may therefore cause confusion.
A problem for gamblers or bettors (terms used interchangeably) is that some games occur con-
temporaneously or at times such that it is not possible to bet on them sequentially. Rather, the
gambler must either bet on one game only or bet on two or more games at the same time. This
occurs for example when two football games overlap in time or when they occur in another time
zone at local times when the gambler cannot wait for one to nish before betting on the other.
Other possibilities are that the gambler may want to secure the xed betting odds available on both
games immediately or before the rst is played, rather than risk these deteriorating beforehand or
between games. Bets must then be made together.
A gambler may bet on any combination of outcomes if the bookmaker is willing to accept such
“multiple” bets. The bettor’s stake is lost if any leg of the multiple bet does not occur. A winning
multiple bet under a xed-odds system usually sees the bettor receive the product of the individual
games’ contractual (gross) payouts per dollar staked. The bookmaker thus treats the games as
independent. In Britain this type of betting is called an accumulator , in the United States it is
known as a parlay bet, and elsewhere it is simply a multibet , or multi . Given n simultaneous games,
we dene a k-multi, for 1≤k≤n, to be a multibet on k games.
In this paper, we consider the problem of determining the optimal betting strategy when multi-
betting is available. This is an asset allocation problem, viz. “How can the bettor apportion his
bankroll over single games and their conjunctions such that his expected utility is maximized?”.
We show that if the bookmaker’s “take” is a xed proportion of the bet, multibetting dominates
irrespective of the bettor’s utility function. More specically, in the case of n simultaneous games,
OPTIMAL BETTING STRATEGIES FOR SIMULTANEOUS GAMES
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the optimal strategy consists of betting only on n-multis. A practical example of this type of
multibet is the “daily double” at U.S. racetracks; see Ali (1979), Asch and Quandt (1987), Thaler
and Ziemba (1988). 1
By comparison, if the bookmaker’s take is multiplicative the optimal betting strategy depends
on the bettor’s utility function. In the case of a log utility (Kelly) bettor, we demonstrate that the
optimal betting strategy requires multibets on all subsets of the n simultaneous games for which the
bettor has positive expected dollar-return. For example, in the case of i = 3 simultaneous games,
each with j = 2 possible outcomes, the bettor must make seven separate bets. These include one
3-multi, three 2-multis, and three 1-multis (bets on single games). We nd an analytic solution for
the optimal fraction of wealth for a Kelly bettor to risk on each combined outcome, for any number
of games, each with any number of outcomes. This set of optimal fractions is simply the product of
each of the individual game Kelly fractions, f i,j , and complements, b i,j = 1−f i,j . Continuing the
above example, the optimal fraction of wealth for the bettor to risk on the 3-multi is the product
of the three optimal Kelly (1956) fractions for individual games. The optimal fraction to be risked
on the rst 2-multi (the combination of game 1 and game 2) is the product of the individual game
Kelly fractions for games 1 and 2, multiplied by the complement of the Kelly fraction on game 3.
The pattern continues similarly. Interestingly, the log-optimal betting strategy for n simultaneous
games produces the same prot, and hence utility, as if the bettor was able to bet log-optimally on
all n games sequentially.
2. Notation and Definitions
Suppose there are n∈N simultaneous games. For each i∈I={1, 2, . . . , n}, let m i ∈N be the
number of possible outcomes in game i, andO i ={1, 2, . . . , m i }the corresponding set of possible
outcomes. The bettor’s subjective probability of outcome j in game i is denoted by p i,j , 1≤j≤m i .
For each 1≤k≤n, dene the set,M k , of k -multis by
(1)
M k ={{(i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), . . . , (i k , j k )}: j s ∈O i s and i s = i t only if s = t},
and dene the set of all multis,M, by
n
(2)
M=
M k .
k=1
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A. GRANT, D. JOHNSTONE, AND O. KWON
Let γ, γ ∈M. ThenMis equipped with a natural partial order under which γ≺γ if and only if
γ⊂γ . For any γ ={(i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), . . . , (i k , j k )}∈M, let
(3)
I γ ={i 1 , . . . , i k }⊂I,
and for i∈I γ dene γ i = j where (i, j)∈γ so that γ i s = j s for 1≤s≤k. Moreover, dene
k
(4)
p γ =
p i s ,j s =
p i,γ i =
p γ .
s=1
i∈I
γ≺γ ∈M n
It is assumed that the bookmaker accepts bets on any element ofM. The contractual payout by
the bookmaker can be identied with a map α :M→R + , where α γ , for any γ∈M, is the (gross)
payout per dollar bet if the outcome from game i is γ i for all i∈I γ . A gambler in this market
places bets on one or more γ∈Mby wagering an appropriate fraction, f γ , of his wealth on each
such γ. Based on the actual outcome, γ ∈M n , from all the games, the gambler is paid α γ per
dollar bet on γ if and only if γ≺γ . Note that the gambler is not required to place a bet on all
γ∈M.
For each i∈Iand j∈O i , let ρ i,j be the implied bookmaker probability for the outcome j in
game i, and for any γ∈Mdene
(5)
ρ γ =
ρ i,γ i
=
ρ γ
i∈I
γ≺γ ∈M n
in analogy with (4). Then in the absence of a bookmaker take, it would be the case that the payout
on γ is
(6)
α γ =
1
ρ γ .
3.
Optimal Strategy Under Fixed Percentage Take
In this section, suppose that the bookmaker takes a xed fraction, ǫ > 0, of each bet so that the
actual payout, α γ , for any γ∈M, is
(7)
α γ = (1−ǫ)α γ ,
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OPTIMAL BETTING STRATEGIES FOR SIMULTANEOUS GAMES
5
where α γ is the payout in the absence of bookmaker take as in (6). We show below that, irrespective
of the utility function of the gambler, the optimal strategy under (7) consists of betting only on
n-multis, viz. only on elements ofM n .
For each γ∈M, let δ γ be the delta function onMdened by
: 1, if γ = γ,
(8)
δ γ ) =
0, if γ = γ,
and let χ γ :M→R be dened by
(9)
χ γ =
δ γ .
γ≺γ ∈M n
The payout function for a one dollar bet on γ∈Mcan then be written succinctly as α γ χ γ . Note
that for γ∈M n we have χ γ = δ γ .
Lemma 1: Let the bookmaker payouts be given by (7). Then for any γ∈M , there exist f γ ∈R +
with γ ∈M n and
γ ∈M n f γ = 1 such that
(10)
α γ χ γ =
f γ α γ χ γ .
γ ∈M n
That is, the payouts from a bet on any γ∈M can be replicated by a suitable combination of bets
on n -multis.
Proof . For any γ ∈M n , dene f γ ∈R + by
(11)
f γ =
: α γ γ if γ≺γ ,
0
otherwise.
Then we have
f γ = α γ
1
α γ
= α γ
ρ γ
(1−ǫ)
γ ∈M n
γ≺γ ∈M n
γ≺γ ∈M n
=
α γ
(1−ǫ)
ρ γ =
(1−ǫ) 1
= 1,
α γ
γ≺γ ∈M n
8
<
<
α γ
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