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The U.S. Air Force in Korea
AIR FORCE HISTORY AND MUSEUMS PROGRAM
2000
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The fight for air superiority began the day the Korean War started
and only ended with the armistice three years later. Once the shock of
the North Koreans’ invasion wore off, it did not take long for the
United States Air Force, assisted by other United Nations air forces,
to destroy the North Korean Air Force. The arrival of the MiG–15 in
November 1950, often flown by Soviet pilots, changed things con-
siderably however. For the remainder of the war, bitterly contested
air battles were fought almost daily. Yet despite a decided numerical
superiority in jet fighters, the Communists were never able to gain air
superiority, testament to the skill and training of the UN fighter pi-
lots, primarily those U.S. Air Force airmen flying the magnificent
F–86 Sabre.
he North Korean forces that invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, were
vastly superior to those of its southern neighbor, particularly in air units.
Although its military was primarily ground-oriented, North Korea pos-
sessed an efficient air force. The North Korean Air Force (NKAF) consisted of ap-
proximately 132 combat aircraft and another 30 transports and trainers, These
combat aircraft were “hand-me-downs” from the Soviet Union—Lavochkin
La–9s, Ilyushin Il–10s, and Yakovlev Yak–3s and –7Bs. Front-line aircraft during
World War II, they were now considered obsolescent by Soviet standards.
Nonetheless, flown by aggressive and well-trained pilots against little opposition
from the tiny Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF), they were still capable of
inflicting considerable damage.
In contrast to its numerically and technologically superior opponent, the
ROKAF was little more than an air force in name. Given South Korean president
Syngman Rhee’s strong anti-Communist feelings and very aggressive attitude to-
ward North Korea, the official American policy had been to build an indigenous
security force just large enough to maintain internal order and public safety. The
ROKAF had but 16 planes: 13 liaison types and 3 T–6 trainers. Of its 57 pilots,
only 39 were considered to be trained. Having little with which to fight, the
ROKAF was virtually wiped out during the first days of the war.
A much more substantial foe faced the North Koreans from across the Sea of
Japan, however. The U.S. Far East Air Forces (FEAF), commanded by Lt. Gen.
George E. Stratemeyer, was part of the occupation forces in Japan. It was the Unit-
ed States Air Force’s largest overseas command, with 35,122 people assigned.
FEAF contained three air forces: the Thirteenth headquartered at Clark Field in
the Philippines, the Twentieth at Kadena on Okinawa, and the Fifth at Nagoya,
Japan. It was Maj. Gen. Earle E. “Pat” Partridge’s Fifth Air Force that would bear
the brunt of the fighting in Korea.
In numbers, FEAF appeared ready for any contingency. As of May 31, 1950,
it possessed 1,172 aircraft: 504 F–80s, 47 F–51s, 42 F–82s, 73 B–26s, 27 B–29s,
179 transports, 48 reconnaissance aircraft, and 252 miscellaneous types (T–6,
SB–17, T–33, etc.). Although the F–80C was by far the most numerous and most
modern aircraft in FEAF’s inventory, it was rapidly approaching obsolescence.
Furthermore, of these 1,172 aircraft, only 657 were actually available for use in
Korea, and not all of these were combat-ready. The remaining aircraft were either
in storage or had to be used for missions with the Thirteenth and Twentieth Air
Forces and in the defense of Japan, FEAF’s primary mission.
Then too, as in all of the services, postwar budget cuts militated against
FEAF’s being a truly effective force for any major contingency. Inadequate engi-
neering support, shortages of personnel in certain categories (i.e., navigators and
bombardiers), reduced training time, and little fat in the form of spare aircraft to
replace losses hampered its operations considerably.
Despite these shortcomings, FEAF was ready to fight, though its initial mis-
sions were defensive. With the enemy driving hard toward Seoul, the American
ambassador asked General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Com-
mander, Allied Powers and also the Commander in Chief, Far East Command to
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