Liberalism And Its Discontents.pdf

Geuss / LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

RAYMOND GEUSS

University of Cambridge

AgentsincontemporaryWesternsocietiesfindthemselvesinanoddsitu-

ation.Ontheonehand,weseemtohavenorealisticalternativetoliberalism;

thatis,weknowofnootherapproachtohumansocietyandpoliticsthatisat

thesametimeastheoreticallyrichandcomprehensiveasliberalismandalso

even remotely as morally acceptable to wide sections of the population in

Westernsocieties,astheyarenowinfactconstituted. 1 Liberalideaspermeate

oursocialworldandoureverydayexpectationsabouthowpeopleandinstitu-

tionswillandoughttoact;theyconstitutethefinalframeworkwithinwhich

ourpoliticalthinkingmoves.Primafacienonliberalformsofhabitualbelief,

suchasthoseassociatedwithcertainreligions,formsofnationalism,residual

class enmities, and so on, still, of course, exist, but they seem to be, at best,

isolated and localised foreign bodies in a universe, the overall structure of

which is essentially liberal; in societies that are or are aspiring to be ‘West-

ern’,eventhesenonliberalideologicalfragmentssometimesadoptprotective

colouration in the form of the best veneer of compatibility with liberalism

they can muster.

On the other hand, there are signs of a significant theoretical, moral, and

political disaffection with some aspects of liberalism. Liberalism has for a

longtimeseemedtolackmuchinspirationalpotential;itisgoodatdissolving

AUTHOR’SNOTE:ThistextisarevisedversionofanarticleIwroteinGermanandpublishedin

December2001inthe DeutscheZeitschriftfürPhilosophie underthetitle‘DasUnbehagenam

Liberalismus’. The original German article in turn was the content of a series of three talks I

gave at the University of Saarbrücken in December 2000. My thanks to Professor Wilfried

HinschofSaarbrückenforthekindinvitationtospeakthere,andalsotothecolleaguesinCam-

bridgewithwhomIhavediscussedthistopicmostfrequently,JohnDunn,ZeevEmmerich,and

QuentinSkinner.IalsooweagreatdebtofgratitudetoHilaryGaskinandtothetwoanonymous

readersforthisjournalwhohelpedmetocorrectseveralmistakesandsignificantlyimprovethe

original German version of the essay.

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 30 No. 3, June 2002 320-338

320

POLITICAL THEORY / June 2002

Geuss / LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 321

traditionalmodesoflifeandtheirassociatedvalues,butlessobviouslygood

at replacing them with anything particularly distinctive or admirable. 2 It fits

all too comfortably with some of the more ignoble aspects of commercial

society. What contribution could liberalism conceivably make to thinking

about the general degradation of the planetary environment? Liberal ideals

likeindividualism,toleration,orlimitationofstatepower,seemeithershort-

sightedly confused or mere covers for hegemonic designs. As the Harvard

politicalscientistSamuelHuntingdonnotoriouslywrote,‘Whatisuniversal-

ismtotheWestisimperialismtotherest’. 3 Oldercriticismsofliberalismhave

also lost none of their power and plausibility: that it has no clear remedy for

poverty,forreprehensibleformsofinequalityofpower,ofconditionsoflife,

andsoon.Totheextenttowhichliberalismiscommittedtotheprinciplesof

individualinitiativeandthedefenceofprivateproperty,itishardtoavoidthe

suspicionthatitisratherpartoftheproblemthanpartofthesolution.Politi-

cal theories, however, which, like liberalism, are deeply anchored in the

social institutions, the mentality, and the form of life of large and wealthy

populations cannot easily be shifted by even the most vigorous forms of

intentionalhumanaction.Thisinertiaeveninthefaceofmassiveandtelling

criticism is not merely the disreputable result of the brute power of the past;

rather, in an uncertain, dangerous, and unpredictable world there are good

general reasons not to embark on radical changes in one’s social formation

unless one is forced to it by demonstrable overwhelming necessity.

The title of this essay is modelled on that of a late essay by Freud. 4 For

Freud we moderns are condemned to suffer from cultural imperatives and

regulations that do not allow us to lead a biologically fulfilling life, but that

we are also not able simply to throw off. ‘Discontent’with civilisation is an

unavoidablefate,giventheincompatibilitybetweenourbiologyandthenec-

essarydemandsofanyformofspecificallyhumansociety,andFreudthinks

thatitisstrictlyimpossibletodoawaywithitaltogether;thebestwecandois

trytomitigatesomeofitsworsteffects.Incontrasttothis,thediscontentwe

feelwithliberalismisofadifferenttype,ifonlybecausewecanbesurethat

changesintheworldaroundus,inourpolitics,oursocialarrangements,our

economic circumstances, or perhaps simply an improvement in our powers

oftheoreticalimagination,willsoonerorlaterdissolveliberalismandrender

itasirrelevanttousasfeudalismortheoriesofmoralitybasedonhonour.In

the meantime, though, we are stuck with a political and social regime and a

set of associated doctrines whose deficiencies are palpable.

Historically,liberalismisaninventionofthenineteenthcentury. 5 ‘Liberal’

wasoriginallyawordusedtodesignateapoliticalparty;itseemstohavebeen

used for the first time in about 1810-11 to refer to a group in Spain whose

membersadvocatedalimitationoftheprivilegesofthekingandtheintroduc-

322 POLITICAL THEORY / June 2002

tionofaconstitutionalmonarchyontheBritishmodel. Expost ,alegitimising

prehistory of liberalism is constructed in which Spinoza, Locke,

Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and others are made to feature prominently as

theoreticalprecursors.Sinceatthelatestthemiddleofthenineteenthcentury,

then, ‘liberalism’refers both to a relatively abstract theoretical structure—a

collection of characteristic arguments, ideals, values, concepts—and to a

socialreality,apoliticalmovementthatisatleastpartiallyinstitutionalisedin

organisedparties.Janus-facedhistoricalphenomenaofthiskindthatencom-

passbothconceptualortheoreticalelementsandrealsocialforcesposespe-

cialdifficultiesfortraditionalformsofphilosophy.Sinceitsbeginning,phi-

losophy has oriented itself primarily on the analysis and evaluation of

relativelywell-definedarguments,butthestrugglebetweencompetingpolit-

icalgroupsisnotaseminardiscussion.Questionsofdefinitionandofpurely

theoreticalconsistencyareoftennotthemostrelevantonestoaskinpolitics. 6

Classicalliberalismisbestunderstoodasanegativephenomenon,areac-

tionagainstcertainevents,theories,andsocialandpoliticaltendenciesinthe

lateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturiesthatearlyliberalsidentifiedas

especiallydangerous. 7 Inaddition,thiswasatwofoldreaction,akindofwar

on two fronts. In one direction, as it were, vis-à-vis the past, liberalism

opposes absolutism and also the cameralist idea that the state had the duty

andtherighttocareforthepositivewell-beingofitsmembersinanextensive

sense. In the other direction, facing the future, classical liberalism strongly

rejects the exaggerated moralisation of politics that it sees as propagated by

the French Revolutionaries. The ideological precursors of liberalism in the

eighteenthcenturywerestaunchopponentsofthesubordinationofpoliticsto

theology,andtotheextenttowhichanabsolutistethicssimplystepsintothe

placethatnowdiscreditedtheologyonceoccupiedinthepoliticalandsocial

spherewithoutchangingtheexistingstructures,ittoobecomesanappropri-

ate object of liberal criticism. Rousseau’s theory of the republic as the

embodimentofaunitarygeneralwillopensupahighlyinsalubrious,specifi-

cally modern possibility, that of clothing political decisions with the mantle

ofanunlimited,secularmoralauthority.Kant’sattempttogroundpoliticson

a nonnaturalist categorical ethics is understood by liberals as a parallel phe-

nomenon and correspondingly condemned. Thus, for the early liberal

BenjaminConstant,Robespierre’s‘ republiquedelavertu etdelaterreur ’is

anaturaloutcomeoftakingRousseau’scentralconceptionsatfacevalue,and

Geuss / LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS 323

absolutistethicsoftheKantiantypeisjustanother,slightlyetiolatedversion

of the same basic position. 8

There are four chief components of the classical liberalism of Constant,

Mill,anddeTocqueville.First,liberalsassignahighpositivevaluetotolera-

tion, as the cardinal virtue of human societies. This is the oldest layer in the

liberalsynthesis.Second,liberalsattributespecialnormativeimportancetoa

particular kind of human freedom. Society should consist as much as possi-

bleofvoluntaryrelationsbetweenpeople,andinparticular,thefreeassentof

themembersistheonlysourceofpoliticalauthority.Third,liberalsarecom-

mittedtoindividualism:asocietyisgoodonlytotheextenttowhichtheindi-

viduals in it are well off. Fourth, liberalism is characterised by a particular

kindofanxiety,thefearofunlimited,concentrated,orarbitrarypower.Limi-

tation of such power is thus always a goal of liberal politics. These four ele-

ments constitute the political substance of the traditional liberalism of the

nineteenth century.

Sincemyintentionistostartfromliberalismasahistoricalphenomenon,

itisimportanttotryasfaraspossibletoavoidanachronism,thatis,toavoid

narratingthehistoryofliberalismfromanend-pointinthepresentthatispos-

itivelyvaluedandassumedteleologicallyasthenaturalgoalofthehistorical

process. Precisely this kind of anachronistic view seems to me to have

become increasingly common in late twentieth-century liberalism, espe-

ciallyundertheimpactoftheworkofJohnRawls.Startinginthelater1950s,

Rawls’s work gave impetus to a revival of political philosophy, a discipline

thathadbeenpronouncedmoribundbysomeofitsmostdistinguishedpracti-

tioners a few years before, and his early achievement, especially as docu-

mentedby TheoryofJustice 9 ledtoacorrespondingattempttoreinterpretthe

historyofliberalismretrospectivelyinthelightofhisposition.Thishadsome

peculiar results, given that Theory of Justice (and the associated early writ-

ings)representedasignificantdeparturefromwhathadbeenthemainlineof

liberal thinking in a number of important respects.

Firstofall,asthetitleofRawls’smajorearlyworkindicates,heplacedthe

conceptofjusticeatthecentreofattention.Since‘justice’forhimisthechief

virtue of a human society, it is understandable that he organises his political

philosophyarounda‘theoryofjustice’.This,however,isarathersurprising

development. To be sure, justice was of great importance to a number of

pagan thinkers in the ancient world—the qualification ‘pagan’is important

herebecausethePaulinestrandofprimitiveChristianityonceagaindemoted

justice(andthe‘law’)infavourof‘grace’ 10 —butIthinkitisfairtosaythatno

particularsaliencyhadbeenattributedto‘justice’inthepoliticalphilosophy

of the modern period. The two originators of modern political philosophy,

324 POLITICAL THEORY / June 2002

Machiavelli and Hobbes, set the tone. For Hobbes, security and self-

preservation are the basic political virtues and the highest goals of politics.

‘Justice’isamereword,thecontentofwhichisgivenbythelawlaiddownby

thesovereign;itisthusahighlyderivativeandnotverysignificantphenome-

non. Machiavelli recognises the variety of disparate goals that humans pur-

sue and a corresponding variety of different conceptions of the good and of

the good life—there is the life of piety, of wealth accumulation, of politics.

Evenwithintherealmofpolitics,apoliticalcommunityistheobjectofpraise

onaccountofits‘greatness’,notitsjustice(inthe Discorsi ),andanindivid-

ual is ‘virtuoso’by virtue of being able to attain fame, honour, glory, praise,

andsoforth,ratherthanforbeing‘just’inmattersofthedistributionofgoods

or the administration of given laws. The theoretical upshot of the work of

thesetwotheoristsisthatjusticeisaminorpropertyofsubordinateadminis-

trative systems rather than the chief virtue of a society as a whole, and that

‘being just’ is the appropriate defining character trait of the administrator,

functionary,orbureaucratratherthanofthepoliticianorcitizen.Tojumpfor-

ward by several centuries from Hobbes, Marx, too, treats justice as an

epiphenomenon.Eachsocioeconomicformationgeneratestheconceptionof

justiceit‘needs’toallowproductiontoproceedassmoothlyaspossible,and

thisconceptionremainsdependentonandhasnostandingoutsidethemode

ofproductioninquestion.Thisrelativetheoreticalinsoucianceaboutthecon-

ceptofjusticeisnotmerelyageneralfeatureofmuchofthemostinteresting

modern political philosophy, but it seems especially characteristic of classi-

cal liberalism. After all, for Humboldt, Constant, Mill, and de Tocqueville,

toleration, freedom, and individualism were focal issues, but justice was

either completely invisible (Constant), or at best a minor side-issue (J. S.

Mill), or finally an object of some suspicion because it could be thought to

presuppose a unitary, centralising view of society that was a danger to indi-

vidualism(Humboldt).Primafacie,itseemshighlyunlikelythattheanalysis

ofaconceptlike‘justice’,whichissohighlydependentonshiftingformsof

economic activity and on historically extremely variable conceptions of the

good life, could give one any real grasp on the central phenomenon of poli-

tics.Ifthisiscorrect,theRawlsianprojectwasheadedinthewrongdirection

from the start, but even if Rawls’s reorientation of political philosophy

aroundtheconceptofjusticewasonitsowntermsaphilosophicallyfruitful

move, it represents a singularly unfortunate position from which to try to

rewrite the history of liberalism, a movement whose members overwhelm-

ingly had very different concerns.

The second main element in Rawls’s early programme was a remoral-

isation of political philosophy. For him, in contrast to most nineteenth-

centuryliberals,politicalphilosophywas‘appliedethics’,andthe‘ethics’in

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: