Rubenstein - A Course in Game Theory - SOLUTIONS.pdf

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Solution Manual for
A Course in Game Theory
Solution Manual for
A Course in Game Theory
by Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
Martin J. Osborne
Ariel Rubinstein
with the assistance of Wulong Gu
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Copyright c · 1994 Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic
or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and
retrieval) without permission in writing from the authors.
This manual was typeset by the authors, who are greatly indebted to Donald Knuth (the
creator of T E X), Leslie Lamport (the creator of L A T E X), and Eberhard Mattes (the creator
of emT E X) for generously putting superlative software in the public domain, and to Ed
Sznyter for providing critical help with the macros we use to execute our numbering
scheme.
Version 1.2, 2005/1/17
Contents
Preface ix
2 Nash Equilibrium 1
Exercise 18.2 (First price auction) 1
Exercise 18.3 (Second price auction) 1
Exercise 18.5 (War of attrition) 2
Exercise 19.1 (Location game) 2
Exercise 20.2 (Necessity of conditions in Kakutani’s theorem) 3
Exercise 20.4 (Symmetric games) 3
Exercise 24.1 (Increasing payos in strictly competitive game) 3
Exercise 27.2 (BoS with imperfect information) 4
Exercise 28.1 (Exchange game) 4
Exercise 28.2 (More information may hurt ) 4
3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium 7
Exercise 35.1 (Guess the average) 7
Exercise 35.2 (Investment race) 7
Exercise 36.1 (Guessing right ) 8
Exercise 36.2 (Air strike) 8
Exercise 36.3 (Technical result on convex sets) 9
Exercise 42.1 (Examples of Harsanyi’s purication) 9
Exercise 48.1 (Example of correlated equilibrium) 10
Exercise 51.1 (Existence of ESS in 2 × 2 game) 10
4 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions 11
Exercise 56.3 (Example of rationalizable actions) 11
Exercise 56.4 (Cournot duopoly) 11
Exercise 56.5 (Guess the average) 11
Exercise 57.1 (Modied rationalizability in location game) 11
Exercise 63.1 (Iterated elimination in location game) 12
Exercise 63.2 (Dominance solvability) 12
Exercise 64.1 (Announcing numbers) 12
Exercise 64.2 (Non-weakly dominated action as best response) 12
5 Knowledge and Equilibrium 13
Zgłoś jeśli naruszono regulamin