Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games 2nd ed - B. Peleg, P. Sudholter (Springer, 2007) WW.pdf

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THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY
General Editors: W. Leinfellner (
Vienna
) and G. Eberlein (
Munich
)
Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences
Series B: Mathematical and Statistical Methods
Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research
Series D: System Theory, Knowledge Engineering and Problem Solving
SERIES C: GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH
VOLUME 34
Editor-in-Chief : H. Peters (Maastricht University, The Netherlands); Honorary Editor: S.
H. Tijs (Tilburg University, The Netherlands).
Editorial Board: E.E.C. van Damme (Tilburg University, The Netherlands); H. Keiding
(University of Copenhagen, Denmark); J.-F. Mertens (Université catholique de Louvain,
Belgium); H. Moulin (Rice University, Houston, USA); Shigeo Muto (Tokyo University,
Japan); T. Parthasarathy (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India); B. Peleg (Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, Israel); T.E.S. Raghavan (University of Illinois at Chicago, USA);
J. Rosenmüller (University of Bielefeld, Germany); A. Roth (Harvard University, USA);
D. Schmeidler (Tel-Aviv University, Israel); R. Selten (University of Bonn, Germany); W.
Thomson (University of Rochester, USA).
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their formal aspects and their applications to economic, political and social sciences as well
as to sociobiology. It will encourage high standards in the application of game-theoretical
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The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume .
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Bezalel Peleg · Peter Sudhölter
Introduction
to the Theory
of Cooperative
Games
Second Edition
123
Professor Bezalel Peleg
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Institute of Mathematics and
Center for the Study of Rationality
Givat-Ram, Feldman Building
91904 Jerusalem
Israel
pelegba@math.huji.ac.il
Professor Peter Sudhölter
University of Southern Denmark
Department of Business and Economics
Campusvej 55
5230 Odense M
Denmark
psu@sam.sdu.dk
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007931451
ISSN 0924-6126
ISBN 978-3-540-72944-0 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
ISBN 978-1-4020-7410-3 1st Edition Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York
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Preface to the Second Edition
The main purpose of the second edition is to enhance and expand the treat-
ment of games with nontransferable utility. The main changes are:
(1) Chapter 13 is devoted entirely to the Shapley value and the Harsanyi so-
lution. Section 13.4 is new and contains an axiomatization of the Harsanyi
solution.
(2) Chapter 14 deals exclusively with the consistent Shapley value. Sections
14.2 and 14.3 are new and present an existence proof for the consistent
value and an axiomatization of the consistent value respectively. Section
14.1, which was part of the old Chapter 13, deals with the consistent value
of polyhedral games.
(3) Chapter 15 is almost entirely new. It is mainly devoted to an investigation
of the Mas-Colell bargaining set of majority voting games. The existence of
the Mas-Colell set is investigated and various limit theorems are proved for
majority voting games. As a corollary of our results we show the existence
of a four-person super-additive and non-levelled (NTU) game whose Mas-
Colell bargaining set is empty.
(4) The treatment of the ordinal bargaining set was moved to the final chap-
ter 16.
We also have used this opportunity to remove typos and inaccuracies from
Chapters 2 – 12 which otherwise remained intact.
We are indebted to all our readers who pointed out some typo. In particular we
thank Michael Maschler for his comments and Martina Bihn who personally
supported this edition.
June 2007
Bezalel Peleg and Peter Sudholter
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