(numbers between lines are page numbers of Suhrkamp´s “Gesammelte Werke” of T.W. Adorno)
Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno: Studies in the Authoritarian Personality
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From T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, vol. I of Studies in Prejudice, edited by
Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman (Social Studies Series: Publication No. III). New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950.
The chapters appearing here are those written by Adorno alone or in collaboration with others.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A. THE PROBLEM
The research to be reported in this volume was guided by the following major hypothesis: that the political, economic, and social convictions of an individual often
form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a "mentality" or "spirit," and that this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality.
The major concern was with the potentially fascistic individual, one whose structure is such as to render him particularly susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda.
We say "potential" because we have not studied individuals who were avowedly fascistic or who belonged to known fascist organizations. At the time when most of
our data were collected fascism had just been defeated in war and, hence, we could not expect to find subjects who would openly identify themselves with it; yet
there was no difficulty in finding subjects whose outlook was such as to indicate that they would readily accept fascism if it should become a strong or respectable
social movement.
In concentrating upon the potential fascist we do not wish to imply that other patterns of personality and ideology might not profitably be studied in the same way. It
is our opinion, however, that no politico-social trend imposes a graver threat to our traditional values and institutions than does fascism, and that knowledge of the
personality forces that favor its acceptance may ultimately prove useful in combating it. A question may be raised as to why, if we wish to explore new resources for
combating fascism, we do not give as much attention to the "potential antifascist." The answer is that we do study trends that stand in opposition to fascism, but we
do not conceive that they constitute any single pattern. It is one
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of the major findings of the present study that individuals who show extreme susceptibility to facist propaganda have a great deal in common. (They exhibit
numerous characteristics that go together to form a "syndrome" although typical variations within this major pattern can be distinguished.) Individuals who are
extreme in the opposite direction are much more diverse. The task of diagnosing potential fascism and studying its determinants required techniques especially
designed for these purposes; it could not be asked of them that they serve as well for various other patterns. Nevertheless, it was possible to distinguish several
types of personality structure that seemed particularly resistant to antidemocratic ideas, and these are given due attention in later chapters.
If a potentially fascistic individual exists, what, precisely, is he like? What goes to make up antidemocratic thought? What are the organizing forces within the
person? If such a person exists, how commonly does he exist in our society? And if such a person exists, what have been the determinants and what the course of
his development?
These are questions upon which the present research was designed to throw some light. Though the notion that the potentially antidemocratic individual is a totality
may be accepted as a plausible hypothesis, some analysis is called for at the start. In most approaches to the problem of political types two essential conceptions
may be distinguished: the conception of ideology and the conception of underlying needs in the person. Though the two may be thought of as forming an organized
whole within the individual, they may nonetheless be studied separately. The same ideological trends may in different individuals have different sources, and the same
personal needs may express themselves in different ideological trends.
The term ideology is used in this book, in the way that is common in current literature, to stand for an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values - a way of
thinking about man and society. We may speak of an individual's total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas of social life: politics, economics,
religion, minority groups, and so forth.
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Ideologies have an existence independent of any single individual; and those which exist at a particular time are results both of historical processes and of
contemporary social events. These ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual's needs and the
degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated.
There are, to be sure, individuals who take unto themselves ideas from more than one existing ideological system and weave them into patterns that are more or less
uniquely their own. It can be assumed, however, that when the opinions, attitudes, and values of numerous individuals are examined, common patterns will be
discovered. These patterns may not in all cases correspond to the familiar, current ideologies, but they will fulfill the definition of ideology given above and in each
case be found to have a function within the over-all adjustment of the individual.
The present inquiry into the nature of the potentially fascistic individual began with anti-Semitism in the focus of attention. The authors, in common with most social
scientists, hold the view that anti-Semitism is based more largely upon factors in the subject and in his total situation than upon actual characteristics of Jews, and
that one place to look for determinants of anti-Semitic opinions and attitudes is within the persons who express them. Since this emphasis on personality required a
focusing of attention on psychology rather than on sociology or history - though in the last analysis the three can be separated only artificially - there could be no
attempt to account for the existence of anti-Semitic ideas in our society. The question was, rather, why is it that certain individuals accept these ideas while others do
not? And since from the start the research was guided by the hypotheses stated above, it was supposed (1) that anti-Semitism probably is not a specific or isolated
phenomenon but a part of a broader ideological framework, and (2) that an individual's susceptibility to this ideology depends primarily upon his psychological
needs.
The insights and hypotheses concerning the antidemocratic individual, which are present in our general cultural climate,
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must be supported by a great deal of painstaking observation, and in many instances by quantification, before they can be regarded as conclusive. How can one say
with assurance that the numerous opinions, attitudes, and values expressed by an individual actually constitute a consistent pattern or organized totality? The most
intensive investigation of that individual would seem to be necessary. How can one say that opinions, attitudes, and values found in groups of people go together to
form patterns, some of which are more common than others? There is no adequate way to proceed other than by actually measuring, in populations, a wide variety
of thought contents and determining by means of standard statistical methods which ones go together.
To many social psychologists the scientific study of ideology, as it has been defined, seems a hopeless task. To measure with suitable accuracy a single, specific,
isolated attitude is a long and arduous proceeding for both subject and experimenter. (It is frequently argued that unless the attitude is specific and isolated, it cannot
properly be measured at all.) How then can we hope to survey within a reasonable period of time the numerous attitudes and ideas that go to make up an ideology?
Obviously, some kind of selection is necessary. The investigator must limit himself to what is most significant, and judgments of significance can only be made on the
basis of theory.
The theories that have guided the present research will be presented in suitable contexts later. Though theoretical considerations had a role at every stage of the
work, a beginning had to be made with the objective study of the most observable and relatively specific opinions, attitudes, and values.
Opinions, attitudes, and values, as we conceive of them, are expressed more or less openly in words. Psychologically they are "on the surface." It must be
recognized, however, that when it comes to such affect-laden questions as those concerning minority groups and current political issues, the degree of openness with
which a person speaks will depend upon the situation in which he finds himself. There may be a discrepancy between what he says on a particular occasion and
what he "really thinks." Let us say that what he really thinks
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he can express in confidential discussion with his intimates. This much, which is still relatively superficial psychologically, may still be observed directly by the
psychologist if he uses appropriate techniques - and this we have attempted to do.
It is to be recognized, however, that the individual may have "secret" thoughts which he will under no circumstances reveal to anyone else if he can help it; he may
have thoughts which he cannot admit to himself, and he may have thoughts which he does not express because they are so vague and ill-formed that he cannot put
them into words. To gain access to these deeper trends is particularly important, for precisely here may lie the individual's potential for democratic or antidemocratic
thought and action in crucial situations.
What people say and, to a lesser degree, what they really think depends very largely upon the climate of opinion in which they are living; but when that climate
changes, some individuals adapt themselves much more quickly than others. If there should be a marked increase in antidemocratic propaganda, we should expect
some people to accept and repeat it at once, others when it seemed that "everybody believed it," and still others not at all. In other words, individuals differ in their
susceptibility to antidemocratic propaganda, in their readiness to exhibit antidemocratic tendencies. It seems necessary to study ideology at this "readiness level" in
order to gauge the potential for fascism in this country. Observers have noted that the amount of outspoken anti-Semitism in pre-Hitler Germany was less than that
in this country at the present time; one might hope that the potentiality is less in this country, but this can be known only through intensive investigation, through the
detailed survey of what is on the surface and the thorough probing of what lies beneath it.
A question may be raised as to what is the degree of relationship between ideology and action. If an individual is making antidemocratic propaganda or engaging in
overt attacks upon minority group members, it is usually assumed that his opinions, attitudes, and values are congruent with his action; but comfort is sometimes
found in the thought that though another individual expresses antidemocratic ideas verbally,
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he does not, and perhaps will not, put them into overt action. Here, once again, there is a question of potentialities. Overt action, like open verbal expression,
depends very largely upon the situation of the moment - something that is best described in socioeconomic and political terms - but individuals differ very widely
with respect to their readiness to be provoked into action. The study of this potential is a part of the study of the individual's over-all ideology; to know what kinds
and what intensities of belief, attitude, and value are likely to lead to action, and to know what forces within the individual serve as inhibitions upon action are
matters of the greatest practical importance.
There seems little reason to doubt that ideology-in-readiness (ideological receptivity) and ideology-in-words and in action are essentially the same stuff. The
description of an individual's total ideology must portray not only the organization on each level but organization among levels. What the individual consistently says
in public, what he says when he feels safe from criticism, what he thinks but will not say at all, what he thinks but will not admit to himself, what he is disposed to
think or to do when various kinds of appeal are made to him - all these phenomena may be conceived of as constituting a single structure. The structure may not be
integrated, it may contain contradictions as well as consistencies, but it is organized in the sense that the constituent parts are related in psychologically meaningful
ways.
In order to understand such a structure, a theory of the total personality is necessary. According to the theory that has guided the present research, personality is a
more or less enduring organization of forces within the individual. These persisting forces of personality help to determine response in various situations, and it is thus
largely to them that consistency of behavior - whether verbal or physical - is attributable. But behavior, however consistent, is not the same thing as personality;
personality lies behind behavior and within the individual. The forces of personality are not responses but readinesses for response; whether or not a readiness
will issue in overt expression depends not only upon the situation of the moment
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but up on what other readinesses stand in opposition to it. Personality forces which are inhibited are on a deeper level than those which immediately and consistently
express themselves in overt behavior.
What are the forces of personality and what are the processes by which they are organized? For theory as to the structure of personality we have leaned most
heavily upon Freud, while for a more or less systematic formulation of the more directly observable and measurable aspects of personality we have been guided
primarily by academic psychology. The forces of personality are primarily needs (drives, wishes, emotional impulses) which vary from one individual to another in
their quality, their intensity, their mode of gratification, and the objects of their attachment, and which interact with other needs in harmonious or conflicting patterns.
There are primitive emotional needs, there are needs to avoid punishment and to keep the good will of the social group, there are needs to maintain harmony and
integration within the self.
Since it will be granted that opinions, attitudes, and values depend upon human needs, and since personality is essentially an organization of needs, then personality
may be regarded as a determinant of ideological preferences. Personality is not, however, to be hypostatized as an ultimate determinant. Far from being something
which is given in the beginning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surrounding world, personality evolves under the impact of the social environment and can
never be isolated from the social totality within which it occurs. According to the present theory, the effects of environmental forces in moulding the personality are,
in general, the more profound the earlier in the life history of the individual they are brought to bear. The major influences upon personality development arise in the
course of child training as carried forward in a setting of family life. What happens here is profoundly influenced by economic and social factors. It is not only that
each family in trying to rear its children proceeds according to the ways of the social, ethnic, and religious groups in which it has membership, but crude economic
factors affect directly the parents' behavior toward the child.
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This means that broad changes in social conditions and institutions will have a direct bearing upon the kinds of personalities that develop within a society.
The present research seeks to discover correlations between ideology and sociological factors operating in the individual's past - whether or not they continue to
operate in his present. In attempting to explain these correlations the relationships between personality and ideology are brought into the picture, the general
approach being to consider personality as an agency through which sociological influences upon ideology are mediated. If the role of personality can be made clear,
it should be possible better to understand which sociological factors are the most crucial ones and in what ways they achieve their effects.
Although personality is a product of the social environment of the past, it is not, once it has developed, a mere object of the contemporary environment. What has
developed is a structure within the individual, something which is capable of self-initiated action upon the social environment and of selection with respect to varied
impinging stimuli, something which though always modifiable is frequently very resistant to fundamental change. This conception is necessary to explain consistency
of behavior in widely varying situations, to explain the persistence of ideological trends in the face of contradicting facts and radically altered social conditions, to
explain why people in the same sociological situation have different or even conflicting views on social issues, and why it is that people whose behavior has been
changed through psychological manipulation lapse into their old ways as soon as the agencies of manipulation are removed.
The conception of personality structure is the best safeguard against the inclination to attribute persistent trends in the individual to something "innate" or "basic" or
"racial" within him. The Nazi allegation that natural, biological traits decide the total being of a person would not have been such a successful political device had it
not been possible to point to numerous instances of relative fixity in human behavior and to challenge those who thought to explain them on any basis
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other than a biological one. Without the conception of personality structure, writers whose approach rests upon the assumption of infinite human flexibility and
responsiveness to the social situation of the moment have not helped matters by referring persistent trends which they could not approve to "confusion" or
"psychosis" or evil under one name or another. There is, of course, some basis for describing as "pathological" patterns of behavior which do not conform with the
most common, and seemingly most lawful, responses to momentary stimuli. But this is to use the term pathological in the very narrow sense of deviation from the
average found in a particular context and, what is worse, to suggest that everything in the personality structure is to be put under this heading. Actually, personality
embraces variables which exist widely in the population and have lawful relations one to another. Personality patterns that have been dismissed as "pathological"
because they were not in keeping with the most common manifest trends or the most dominant ideals within a society, have on closer investigation turned out to be
but exaggerations of what was almost universal below the surface in that society. What is "pathological" today may with changing social conditions become the
dominant trend of tomorrow.
It seems clear then that an adequate approach to the problems before us must take into account both fixity and flexibility; it must regard the two not as mutually
exclusive categories but as the extremes of a single continuum along which human characteristics may be placed, and it must provide a basis for understanding the
conditions which favor the one extreme or the other. Personality is a concept to account for relative permanence. But it may be emphasized again that personality is
mainly a potential; it is a readiness for behavior rather than behavior itself; although it consists in dispositions to behave in certain ways, the behavior that actually
occurs will always depend upon the objective situation. Where the concern is with antidemocratic trends, a delineation of the conditions for individual expression
requires an understanding of the total organization of society.
It has been stated that the personality structure may be such
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as to render the individual susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda. It may now be asked what are the conditions under which such propaganda would increase in
pitch and volume and come to dominate in press and radio to the exclusion of contrary ideological stimuli, so that what is now potential would become actively
manifest. The answer must be sought not in any single personality nor in personality factors found in the mass of people, but in processes at work in society itself. It
seems well understood today that whether or not antidemocratic propaganda is to become a dominant force in this country depends primarily upon the situation of
the most powerful economic interests, upon whether they, by conscious design or not, make use of this device for maintaining their dominant status. This is a matter
about which the great majority of people would have little to say.
The present research, limited as it is to the hitherto largely neglected psychological aspects of fascism, does not concern itself with the production of propaganda. It
focuses attention, rather, upon the consumer, the individual for whom the propaganda is designed. In so doing it attempts to take into account not only the
psychological structure of the individual but the total objective situation in which he lives. It makes the assumption that people in general tend to accept political and
social programs which they believe will serve their economic interests. What these interests are depends in each case upon the individual's position in society as
defined in economic and sociological terms. An important part of the present research, therefore, was the attempt to discover what patterns of socioeconomic
factors are associated with receptivity, and with resistance, to antidemocratic propaganda.
At the same time, however, it was considered that economic motives in the individual may not have the dominant and crucial role that is often ascribed to them. If
economic selfinterest were the only determinant of opinion, we should expect people of the same socioeconomic status to have very similar opinions, and we should
expect opinion to vary in a meaningful way from one socioeconomic grouping to another. Research has not given very sound support for these expecta-
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tions. There is only the most general similarity of opinion among people of the same socioeconomic status, and the exceptions are glaring; while variations from one
socioeconomic group to another are rarely simple or clear-cut. To explain why it is that people of the same socioeconomic status so frequently have different
ideologies, while people of a different status often have very similar ideologies, we must take account of other than purely economic needs.
More than this, it is becoming increasingly plain that people very frequently do not behave in such a way as to further their material interests, even when it is clear to
them what these interests are. The resistance of white-collar workers to organization is not due to a belief that the union will not help them economically; the
tendency of the small businessman to side with big business in most economic and political matters cannot be due entirely to a belief that this is the way to guarantee
his economic independence. In instances such as these the individual seems not only not to consider his material interests, but even to go against them. It is as if he
were thinking in terms of a larger group identification, as if his point of view were determined more by his need to support this group and to suppress opposite ones
than by rational consideration of his own interests. Indeed, it is with a sense of relief today that one is assured that a group conflict is merely a clash of economic
interests - that each side is merely out to "do" the other - and not a struggle in which deep-lying emotional drives have been let loose. When it comes to the ways in
which people appraise the social world, irrational trends stand out glaringly. One may conceive of a professional man who opposes the immigration of Jewish
refugees on the ground that this will increase the competition with which he has to deal and so decrease his income. However undemocratic this may be, it is at least
rational in a limited sense. But for this man to go on, as do most people who oppose Jews on occupational grounds, and accept a wide variety of opinions, many of
which are contradictory, about Jews in general, and to attribute various ills of the world to them, is plainly illogical. And it is just as illogical to praise all Jews in
accordance with a "good" stereo-
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type of them. Hostility against groups that is based upon real frustration, brought about by members of that group, undoubtedly exists, but such frustrating
experiences can hardly account for the fact that prejudice is apt to be generalized. Evidence from the present study confirms what has often been indicated: that a
man who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others. There is no conceivable rational basis for such
generalization; and, what is more striking, prejudice against, or totally uncritical acceptance of, a particular gr...
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