01 FIREFLY COLLECTION.pdf

FIREFLY COLLECTION No.1

VIKING

SUMMER

5.SS-PANZER-DIVISION IN POLAND, 1944

WRITTEN AND ILLUSTRATED BY

DENNIS OLIVER

SUPERBLY DETAILED COLOUR PROFILES, BLACK AND WHITE ARCHIVE PHOTOGRAPHS,

COMPREHENSIVE ORGANISATIONAL AND EQUIPMENT CHARTS, UNIT HISTORY AND MAPS

FIREFLY COLLECTION

VIKING SUMMER

5.SS-PANZER-DIVISION IN POLAND, 1944

Written and illustrated by Dennis Oliver

ISBN 978-0-9806593-9-9

Acknowledgments. The author and publisher would like to thank the staff of the National Library of Australia, Canberra, the State Library of Queensland and

Darren Neeley at Fox Company Research, Maryland for their invaluable assistance and advice. We would also like to thank all those who contribute to the Axis

History Forum, the Feldgrau Forum, Panzer-Archiv.de, Die Deutsche Wehrmacht website, the Wiking Ruf website, the Panther1944 website and Brett Green at

Missing Lynx. We also wish to thank Glenn Bartolotti for permission to reproduce the photograph of his scale model Panther ausf A which can also be seen at

mysite.verizon.net/ressi2si/armormodelsbyglennbartolotti. In addition to the websites mentioned above, the following printed works were also consulted:

Die Truppenkennzeicen der Verbände und Einheiten der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS und ihre Einsätze im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945. Schmitz, P

and Theis K-J. Verweht sind die Spuren. Proschek, R. Wenn Alle Brüder Schweigen. Hausser, P et al. Viking Panzers: The German 5th SS Tank Regiment in the

East in World War II. Klapdor, E. Armor Battles of the Waffen-SS, 1943-45. Fey, W and Henschler, H. Panther and its variants. Spielberger, W. PzKpfw. V Panther

Vol 1 . Trojca, W. PzKpfw. V Panther Vol 2. Trojca, W. PzKpfw. V Panther Vol 3. Trojca, W. PzKpfw. V Panther Vol 4. Trojca, W. PzKpfw. V Panther Vol 5. Trojca, W.

PzKpfw. V Panther Vol 6. Trojca, W. PzKpfw. V Panther vol 7. Trojca, W. PzKpfw. V Panther vol 8. Trojca, W. Panther Variants In Color. Trojca, W. Panther Ausf A.

Gawrych, W. Pz.Kpfw. V Panther . Wróblewski, R and Wrobel, A. Panzer Tracts No. 11-1. Panzerbeobachtungswagen. Jentz, T. L. and Doyle, H. L. Panzer IV and

its Variants . Spielberger, W J. Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf G/H/J. Vol 2. Trojca, W. Panzerkampfwagen IV. Schiebert, H. Der Panzerkampfwagen IV. Fleischer, W. Pz.Kpfw.

IV Ausf G, H and J. Jentz, T and Doyle, H. Panzerjäger und Sturmgeschütze. Schiebert, H. German Sturmartillerie At War. Vol 2. De Sisto, F. V. Sturmartillerie.

Spielberger, W.J and Feist, U. Sdkfz 251. Ledwoch, J. Panther. Anderson, T. Panzer IV. Hjermstad, K. Sdkfz 251. Kliment, C. Battle On Two Fronts 1944-45. Cockle,

T. War On Two Fronts. Michulec, R. Panzertruppen. Jentz, T. L. (Editor) Deutsche Kampfpanzer in Farbe 1939-45. Scheibert, H. Nuts and Bolts Vol 6.

Kanonenwagen. Terlisten, D. To The Last Bullet. Germany’s War on 3 Fronts. Part 1. The East. Oliver, D. Endkampf. Fritz,S.

The illustrations in this book were all created using contemporary photographs as a reference and we have attempted to create as faithful a reproduction as

possible - including the shape and position of any camouflage pattern, markings and the style of lettering used. In the few cases where we have been forced to

speculate we have tried to make this clear. Where possible, we have reproduced the photograph or photographs so used, however copyright and budgetary

restrictions and do not always allow this.

Published by ADH Publishing ,

Doolittle Mill

Doolittle Lane

Totternhoe

Bedfordshire LU6 1QX

United Kingdom

Produced in co-operation with The Oliver Publishing Group

Patent Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical,

optical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of ADH Publishing. All enquiries should be addressed to the publisher.

Picture Credits. All photographs National Archives and Record Administration, except: Bundesarchiv: 9,10,13,15,16,18,19,31,33; J. Howard Parker: 3,11,13,15,18,20,22; Author’s

Collection: 2,4,21,29,30; V.I.Polokov: 4,11,12,14,17,19,20,33.Ullstein via K.Berne: 5; K.Berne: 19.

Front cover: Sdkfz 251/9. III.Abteilung, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 Germania. Poland, August 1944.

Above, left: Obersturmbannführer Johannes Mühlenkamp, commander of SS-Panzer-Regiment 5. A highly

decorated officer, Mühlenkamp led the regiment throughout most of 1944 until 10 September, when he took

command of the division. Above, right: A Pzkw V Panther ausf A of 8.Kompanie, numbered 832, photographed

during the fighting east of Warsaw in August 1944. Note the unditching beam held in its purpose built bracket on the

rear hull. By late 1944 most Wiking Panthers were fitted with a similar arrangement. Above: An Fi-156 Fieseler Storch

liaison aircraft, possibly a C-2 or C-3 model. Gruppenführer Herbert Gille used this particular machine when he

commanded the Wiking division and later as commander of IV.SS-Panzerkorps. Although we cannot be certain, this may

be the aircraft he used to fly into the besieged city of Kovel.

The Year 1944 would prove to be a momentous one for the German Army in the

East. Although the Wehrmacht had suffered a series of setbacks and defeats

during the previous twelve months, many Germans were still confident at the

end of 1943 that the front in the East could at least be held and that the

anticipated Allied invasion in the West, when it came, would be defeated. By the

end of 1944 all but the most optimistic, or fanatical, had lost faith in the

promised final victory.

In the East the war would be fought on a gargantuan scale and Germany came

to rely to an ever greater extent on the Army's highly mobile - if increasingly

depleted - armoured units, including those of the Waffen-SS. Among the latter,

the soldiers of 5.SS-Panzer-Division Wiking would play an important role.

On Friday 3 March 1944, the badly battered remnants of the division that had

led the breakout from the encirclement at Cherkassy (1) arrived in Tomaszów in

Poland, approximately 50 kilometres south-west of Warsaw. Tomaszów was far

behind the front line and the men were expecting a period of rest and refitting

and the possibility of home leave. The situation was however far from stabilised

with every man needed and disappointingly all leaves were cancelled, except

for the wounded and the Germanic volunteers.

Since late 1943, II.Abteilung of the division’s SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 had been

training in France with their newly issued Panther tanks and was now alerted on

18 March 1944, that they should be ready for a move to the East. On the same

day, the regiment's I.Abteilung began moving by rail to Chelm, some 200

kilometres further east of Tomaszów, to be re-equipped with men and vehicles.

The first battalion, commanded by Sturmbannführer Paul Kümmel, had

suffered heavily in the Cherkassy fighting and although new vehicles would

eventually arrive, the lack of trained personnel to operate them, particularly

experienced NCOs, would remain a constant problem. Indeed Kümmel's men

lacked such basic requirements as uniform items, razor blades and even

adequate footwear. On 22 March, sufficient crews for twenty-two tanks were

sent to the Magdeburg-Königsborn training facility in Germany to take charge

of their new vehicles. On 31 March, Kümmel's battalion received twenty-two

Pzkw IV tanks, two being allocated to the battalion headquarters with the four

companies receiving five each.

In late March, Kampfgruppe Richter - made up from the remnants of Wiking’s

Germania and Westland Panzergrenadier regiments, the division's artillery

regiment, the anti-aircraft and reconnaissance battalions and commanded by

Standartenführer Joachim Richter from the artillery regiment - made the first

attempts to break the Russian encirclement of Kovel, an important rail junction

in present day Ukraine, almost exactly halfway between Kiev and Warsaw (2).

The meagre German forces inside the Kovel perimeter - which included a

number of hastily armed employees of the German Railways - had been

ordered to hold their positions despite the personal intervention of the Wiking

division's commander, Gruppenführer Herbert Gille, who flew to Berlin to plead

the case for withdrawal but was refused an audience with Hitler. Returning to

the front, Gille decided that he could best assist the defence from inside the city

and together with Hauptsturmführer Westphal landed in his personal Fieseler

Storch aircraft at around noon on 16 March. The decision to remove himself

from the division at such a critical time, criticised in some accounts, illustrates

Gille's confidence in the abilities of his regimental and battalion commanders.

There is no doubt that his presence inside the city contributed greatly to the

morale of the defenders and that the name Kampfgruppe Gille was

intentionally chosen to reassure them that they would not be abandoned.

On Monday 27 March, the headquarters of the tank regiment and the tanks of

8.Kompanie, the latter under Obersturmführer Karl Nicolussi-Leck, arrived at

Maciejów, near Chelm, with a full complement of Panther tanks. The other

companies would arrive in the following days as transport was available (3) but

Nicolussi-Leck's would be the only Wiking tanks available for an immediate

attempt to establish contact with the Kovel defenders. A detailed account of this

operation and a map of the Kovel area can be found on page 2.

Although the tanks of 8.Kompanie were a welcome addition to the Kovel

defences, a secure and permanent corridor to the town had not been opened

and the siege continued. On 2 April a further attack was ordered, this time

supported by Obersturmführer Otto Schneider's 7.Kompanie, and again the

Germans were unsuccessful.

By now however the units of LVI.Panzerkorps had been ordered to assist in the

relief attempts and the following day another attack, this time supported by

6.Kompanie with units of the army's 5.Panzer-Division was launched towards a

Soviet strongpoint at Kruhel, about 6 kilometres north-west of Kovel. Amid

conflicting reports from the units involved (4) the attack was called off at about

5.30pm. On 4 April, after a two hour artillery bombardment, the attacks

resumed with 5.Kompanie supporting II.Abteilung of the Germania Regiment

and 7.Kompanie advancing behind III/Germania, II/Westland, Grenadier-

Regiment 431 and Ski-Jäger-Regiment 2.

The Panthers of 6.Kompanie started from their positions of the previous day,

this time in concert with the tanks of 4.Panzer-Division, and their initial

objective of Kruhel was quickly taken, securing an important stretch of solid

ground - a rare commodity in the marshy Kovel area. The advance of the other

two companies however was not as successful, stalling in front of a heavily

defended wooded area and it was not until a concentrated Stuka attack was

called in that the Germans were able to penetrate the woods - although the

Russians remained in control of much of the area. The units of LVI.Panzerkorps

had however met with greater success, the headquarters assuring the Kovel

defenders by radio as early as 9.30am that this attack would be ‘the decisive

thrust'. The tanks of 4.Panzer-Division entered Moshchena at around noon (5)

to the north of Kovel and advanced to Dubove, less than a kilometre from the

defensive perimeter. By the evening the tanks had fought their way to the

railway line west of the town. In the meantime the Wiking Panthers had

reached Moshchena and from there drove straight towards Kovel.

At first light the next day, the battalion - by now led by the regiment's

commander, Obersturmbannführer Johannes Mühlenkamp - brushed aside

their opposition and reached the railway crossing just outside the perimeter

and within sight of the German defenders. As if to emphasise that the battle

was far from won, Mühlenkamp's tank was immobilised by a mine and he was

forced to withdraw to Moshchena which had become the battalion's

headquarters. By early morning the Germans were in control of Dubove and by

2.00pm had established contact with the units inside Kovel. In three weeks of

heavy fighting, in atrocious weather and facing far superior numbers, the

Germans had managed to deny the city to the Russians and significantly delay

the planned Soviet offensive to take Brest.

The most important task now was to keep the corridor open as small but

determined pockets of Russian troops remained in what was now the German

rear. Indeed, the 5.Kompanie Panther commanded by Untersturmführer Horst

Niemann which had been left to guard the regimental commander's tank

reported that it was being fired on by Russian anti-tank guns situated over

2,000 metres to the west and it was not until 6 April that Mühlenkamp's tank

could be recovered. .......... continued on page 4

A Pzkw V Panther ausf A of 8.Kompanie, SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 and an Sdkfz 251/1 halftrack from

III.Abteilung, SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9 Germania. This photograph was taken in August during

the battles east of Warsaw and the tank company commander, Karl Nicolussi-Leck, can be seen in the

Panther’s cupola facing the camera. This tank is shown and discussed further on page 17 and the

halftrack, numbered 201, is depicted on page 22.

THE ‘PANTHER POUNCE’ AT KOVEL

Kovel had been surrounded since 16 March 1944 and an early attempt to

break the encirclement had been halted in front of the villages of Novi

Koshary and Stari Koshary. On the afternoon of 27 March, the II.Abteilung

of SS-Panzer-Regiment 5 - which had been training on its new Panther

tanks in France - began to arrive and on the following day the regiment’s

commander, Johannes Mühlenkamp, briefed the commander of

8.Kompanie, Obersturmführer Karl Nikolussi-Leck, on his part in the

planned relief attempt.

Kovel and the surrounding area as it appeared in 1942, based on a Soviet military survey map published in

that year. The names of towns, villages and the suburbs of Kovel are those in present usage. Railway lines

are shown in a dark shade while roads and towns are shown in a lighter grey. Areas of marshy terrain

dominate all the approaches to the town and the darker shades represent woodland. Not shown is the

extensive canal system which covered most of the area and fed into the Turiya River. The German

defensive perimeter around Kovel as it was on 4 April, is shown as a broken line. At right: A rather poor

quality photograph but one that is worth reproduction as it shows a Wiking Panther in the streets of

Kovel. In another image of this tank, taken from the same series, it is possible to make out what is almost

certainly an 8.Kompanie number on the turret side.

With sixteen serviceable tanks, 8.Kompanie reached their start positions near

Stari Koshary around 11.00am on the morning of Wednesday 29 March,

guided by Sturmbannführer Franz Hack, commander of the III.Abteilung of SS-

Panzergrenadier-Regiment Germania. On the advice of Hack, Nicolussi-Leck

decided to eliminate a Russian anti-tank gun position situated approximately

one thousand metres east of Stari Koshary which controlled one of the few

areas of solid ground on either side of the rail line. The commander of the

Germania regiment, Obersturmbannführer Dorr who was also present,

agreed and Nicolussi-Leck made ready to move out. Almost immediately

Mühlenkamp arrived and countermanded the order, insisting that any

attempt to take the Russian position would be costly and reduce the already

meagre forces available to break the encirclement. He then ordered Nicolussi-

Leck to advance parallel to the railway line towards Cherkasy and from there

to Kovel via Moschchena.

At around noon the tanks moved off with the Panther of Hauptscharführer

Eugen Faas, the commander of the first platoon, in the lead. On the right were

the grenadiers of Hack's battalion supported by ten assault guns of leichte-

Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190. On Nicolussi-Leck's left were volunteers from

Grenadier-Regiment 434 of 131.Infanterie-Division commanded by

Hauptmann Bolm with a further seven assault guns. Light snow had begun to

fall and almost immediately sporadic artillery fire commenced with shells

landing either side of the tanks, prompting the Panthers to increase their

speed.

Within minutes the Russians were firing with every gun they possessed

including anti-tank guns and heavy mortars. From his advanced position,

Hauptscharführer Faas reported that muzzle flashes from Soviet anti-tank

guns were visible in front and off to his right. Despite the swirling snow the

Panthers of his platoon were able to identify the Russian position and

returning fire, silenced the enemy guns. This was in fact the first Soviet

defensive line and must have been approximately half way between Koshary

and Cherkasy-Volinski railway stations, possibly along the road to Volya-

Kovelska.

As the tanks ground forward, Faas called Nicolussi-Leck to report that Russian

soldiers could be seen leaving their trenches for the shelter of a nearby wood.

The company commander now took the lead and drove straight into the

Russian position held only by a few determined machine gunners who were no

match for the Panthers. From here Nicolussi-Leck ordered his men to advance

north to the rail line, just a short distance away, and to head towards Cherkasy.

Only a few metres further on, the marshy ground gave way to more solid

terrain and the company's second and third platoons were now able to fan out

and advance in line. By now however the snow was falling harder and visibility

was becoming a problem with some crews complaining that they could not

see further than the muzzles of their own guns.

As the weather grew worse, the lead tank of Untersturmführer Immelmann

stumbled into more marshy ground and became hopelessly bogged. Within a

short time four more tanks became bogged and Nicolussi-Leck, also

concerned that the accompanying infantry were being left too far behind,

ordered these tanks to guard his right flank which faced a wood, as a static

defence point under the command of Unterscharführer Kasper. The remaining

tanks resumed the advance and soon came under fire from Russian anti-tank

guns. In his after action report Nicolussi-Leck stated that the Russian position

was some 600 metres west of Cherkasy which would mean that his remaining

tanks must have now been across the railway line. However, later in the same

report he mentions that the attack on the town was carried out by crossing the

railway embankment. This suggests that the Russian anti-tank guns were

actually located not directly to the west, but south-west of Cherkasy on the

southern side of the rail line and there was indeed a narrow stretch of solid

ground there rising towards the embankment, just before the line turns south

towards Cherkasy-Volinski station.

Advancing on the Russians at maximum speed three Panthers were hit in quick

succession - although at least one account suggests that the third was halted

by a mechanical failure. A lucky shot from one of the Panther's guns - possibly

fired from Eugen Faas' tank - detonated the Russian’s reserve ammunition in a

mighty explosion and at that moment the Panthers of the third platoon, which

Nicolussi-Leck had sent to the right to outflank the Soviet position, opened fire

Two Panther tanks photographed on the Kovel-Chelm rail line

during the salvage operation that took place quite some time after

the area was secured. In another photograph of the vehicle at left,

taken from the same series, the number 811 can clearly be seen on

the turret side identifying this as the tank of Eugen Faas which

was disabled by a mine early in the morning of 30 March. The

vehicle pictured below was positioned immediately in front of

Faas’ Panther and may be the tank of Scharführer Herberts.

destroying all twelve Russian guns. As the remaining eight Panthers drove into

the now deserted Russian trenches at exactly 2.30pm, the weather

deteriorated to such an extent that Nicolussi-Leck called a temporary halt to

the attack. In a radio message to Mühlenkamp he reported that his remaining

tanks had reached high ground, some 600 metres to the west of Cherkasy, and

that the accompanying infantry were fighting their way towards his position.

The Panthers remained on the high ground for some 45 minutes and in that

time were able to send out patrols to reconnoitre the surrounding area.

Realising now that Cherkasy was bordered by swamps on three sides

Nicolussi-Leck decided that an attack towards the north-east, directly into the

town was impossible. Considering the options available to him, he directed his

remaining tanks to advance and take Cherkasy by an enveloping move on his

right. However, after moving only a short distance, three more tanks became

bogged and it was obvious that this direction was also untenable. Undetered,

Nicolussi-Leck swung his company to his left and crossed the railway

embankment and although the Panthers immediately came under heavy fire

they were at least on solid ground.

Driving straight towards Cherkasy the Panthers fired on the move as fast as

their guns could be loaded. Before the town could be reached eight German

tanks were hit and immobilised but managed to keep firing and support the

others. With the entire western end of the town in flames and the defenders

streaming towards the east the Panthers, led by Hauptscharführer Faas,

entered Cherkasy urged on by their company commander whose tank was

now stuck in soft mud. Without waiting to consolidate Nicolussi-Leck sent four

tanks towards Moschena, their next objective. Meanwhile Hauptmann

Bolm’s infantry had fought their way through to Cherkasy and now cleared the

remaining Russians from the town.

Although the tanks that had moved off towards Moschena had destroyed

several anti-tank guns, two had become stuck in the mud and at 6.00pm

Mühlenkamp directed Nicolussi-Leck to remain in Cherkasy and screen north,

towards Moschena, and east towards Kovel. Much of the infantry which were

allocated to support the attack were still far to the west and once darkness fell

were only able communicate by signal flare. At 7.00pm Nicolussi-Leck

reported that he had six combat ready tanks but was confident of recovering

four of the vehicles which were stuck in the swampy ground. He was however

concerned that his supplies of fuel and ammunition were unlikely to be

replenished before the attack resumed the next day.

That night Nicolussi-Leck determined that the next day's attack would follow

the railway embankment all the way into Kovel. Although risky, his plan would

conserve what fuel the tanks had left and would ensure that they were at least

able to operate on solid ground all the way to their objective. Further, he

reasoned that the Russians would expect his force to advance towards

Moschena - particularly in light of his reconnaissance towards that town. He

also believed that it was significant that his bogged tanks had not received any

enemy fire from the south or east despite their vulnerable condition.

Therefore, despite the obvious danger, the railway embankment seemed to

offer the best chance of success and at 10.00pm Nicolussi-Leck informed

Mühlenkamp of his intentions. Unknown to Nicolussi-Leck, for he never

received the message, an order was sent from the regimental headquarters at

1.30am the next morning directing him to withdraw to Stari Koshary and for

the men of Grenadier-Regiment 434 to return to their unit. By the time a radio

set powerful enough to reach the company could be found the Panthers were

already on the railway embankment just 2 kilometres outside Kovel.

During the night three of the bogged tanks were recovered and early on the

morning of Thursday 30 March, in complete darkness, the Panthers resumed

their advance towards Kovel. Once again the commander of the first platoon,

Eugen Faas, was in the lead. Almost immediately Faas reported that muzzle

flashes were visible some 400 metres west of the Cherkasy-Volinski railway

station and directed his gunner onto a target which was at three o'oclock to his

tank. This suggests that the Panthers were moving along the main road out of

Cherkasy which heads south-east and leads to the station and not directly

south towards the embankment which would have been the more direct but

perhaps less reliable route. After destroying two T-34 tanks the lead Panthers

reached the embankment but within a hundred metres, Faas' tank was

disabled by a mine, his vehicle holding up the entire column. That Faas was

able to reach the railway embankment is confirmed by photographic

evidence.

The remaining tanks moved to the right - that is the southern side - of the rail

line to bypass the disabled tank and almost immediately another Panther, this

vehicle commanded by Scharführer Herberts, was halted by a mine. Leaving

the safety of his tank and coming forward on foot, Nicolussi-Leck ordered Faas

to take command of a strongpoint using the two disabled Panthers and sixteen

grenadiers. The remaining infantry had formed a defensive screen running

through the buildings of the railway station and the wooded area to the east.

In the meantime a squad of engineers had been sent forward to clear any

additional mines and although a path was secured it was not before 6.00 am.

It was now light and Nicolussi-Leck’s tanks were visible to every Russian in the

area.

As the last mine was being cleared Hauptmann Bolm advised Nicolussi-Leck

that he had received an order that the tanks were not to advance any further.

Stating that he could not remain where he was, Nicolussi-Leck ignored Bolm

and ordered his tanks to push forward towards KoveI. There is some debate

over where the order originated with some accounts stating that it came from

within Kovel via radio and others that it emanated from regimental

headquarters and was delivered directly to Nicolussi-Leck. The latter seems

unlikely as Nicolussi-Leck later said in his defence that he was not obliged to

follow any orders given by Bolm. In any case, Nicolussi-Leck ordered his

remaining tanks forward.

With the company commander's tank in the lead the column had reached a

point less than 2,000 metres from the city when Nicolussi-Leck received a

message from Scharführer Möller commanding the last tank in line. A

despatch rider had caught up with the company with an order that the tanks

were to halt. As Nicolussi-Leck listened to Möller his tank began to take fire

from the Russian positions immediately to his front and at that moment he

heard one of his platoon commanders, Oberscharführer Jauss, state that

these Russian troops were blocking the north-west exit from Kovel. Realising

that if Jauss were correct the German defenders of Kovel were just on the other

side of this Russian position, Nicolussi-Leck ignored the order, told his gunner

to engage the enemy and drove straight at the Russian guns.

Although the Panthers received heavy fire from their left they were shielded

from the worst effects by the snow which had begun to fall heavily once again.

Surging forward the Panthers crushed the Soviet guns under their tracks and

shortly, above the roar of their engines, could hear voices calling to them in

German. At exactly 7.30am the tanks of 8.Kompanie had reached the railway

loop south of Volyn and the defensive perimeter of Kovel.

By 8.10am Nicolussi-Leck, with seven serviceable tanks, was able to report to

Gruppenführer Gille.

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